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INTERPRETING THE SIXTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (BYWAY OF THE DIRECT-
TAX CLAUSES) 
Erik M. 1 ens en· 
Readers of Constitutional Commentary may have missed the 
brouhahas, but Professor Calvin Johnson and I have been argu-
ing for several years about the meaning of the Direct-Tax 
Clauses of the Constitution1 and the Sixteenth Amendment to 
that Constitution.2 I'm happy to say we disagree on almost eve-
rything, and less happy to note that neither constitutional law-
yers nor tax lawyers seem to care very much about any of these 
issues.3 
Our disagreements aren't only about academic trivia. For 
those who insist on practical consequences in legal arguments, 
there really may be something at stake here. The Direct-Tax 
Clauses, parts of the original Constitution, impose a cumber-
some apportionment requirement on taxes that are "direct" -a 
rule tied to the apportionment rule for representation in the 
House of Representatives. In its original form, Article I, section 
2 provided that 
[r]epresentatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned 
among the several States which may be included within this 
Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be 
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, 
'David L. Brennan Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. 
I. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2; U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 4. 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
3. There arc exceptions. For example, apparently worried that his wealth-tax pro-
posals would be at risk if I were taken seriously, Professor Bruce Ackerman has trashed 
me at some length. See Bruce Ackerman, Taxes and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 1-2, 30 n.112, 52-56 (1999). And the editors of the widely read journal Tax Notes have 
graciously printed just about everything Professor Johnson and I have wanted to say on 
the subject, most recently in Erik M. Jensen, The Constitution Mallers in Tax, 100 TAX 
NOTES 821 (2003). See also Lawrence Zelenak, Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, 
and the Conscientious Legislator, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1999) (another tax professor 
encroaching on what would be constitutional lawyers' turf if con lawyers cared about this 
sort of thing). 
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including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and ex-
cluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. 
The special counting conventions for slaves and "Indians not 
taxed" disappeared long ago,4 but the apportionment rule re-
mains. And Article I, section 9, clause 4 similarly provides that 
"[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Pro-
portion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to 
be taken." 
Everyone agrees that apportionment makes direct taxes 
very difficult to implement. The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified 
in 1913, provided some relief, eliminating apportionment as a 
requirement for "taxes on incomes": "The Congress shall have 
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source 
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration." But the Amend-
ment seemed to leave apportionment intact for other direct 
taxes, whatever they are. Avoiding apportionment thus requires 
that a levy be either indirect, in which case the Direct-Tax 
Clauses won't kick in at all (and the Sixteenth Amendment will 
be irrelevant), or a tax on incomes, which the Sixteenth Amend-
ment immunizes. 
A broad definition of "direct taxes" coupled with a narrow 
conception of "taxes on incomes" could leave the Direct-Tax 
Clauses with application broad enough to prevent significant 
change in the way the United States raises revenue. In the last 
decade, several new forms of national taxation have been pro-
posed, including taxes on wealth5 and various types of consump-
tion taxes. 6 If these taxes would be direct but wouldn't be taxes 
4. The Civil War Amendments took care of the rule for slaves, see U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, §§ 1-2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, and the category of "Indians not taxed" 
was effectively eliminated by statute. Indians "born within the territorial limits of the 
United Stales" arc U.S. citizens as a result of the Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, (43 Stat. 
253) 253 repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 1, § 301 (66 Stat.) 235 (current version at 8 
U.S. C.§ 1401(b)), and arc thus generally subject to U.S. taxation. 
5. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTf, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 
(1991)); Ackerman, supra note 3, at 56-58. 
6. Proposed indirect-consumption taxes include a national sales tax or value-
added tax. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Role of a Value-Added Tax in Fundamental Tax 
Reform, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 91 (Michael J. Boskin cd., 1996); Laurence J. 
Kollikoff, Saving and Consumption Taxation: The Federal Retail Sales Tax Example, in 
FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM, supra, at 160. The best-known proposed direct-
consumption taxes arc the so-called "llal tax," born in the academy but promoted by 
Steve Forbes and Dick Armey, see ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT 
TAX (2d cd. 1995);, and the "USA Tax" (Unlimited Savings Allowance Tax), sponsored 
by Senators Nunn and Domenici, see S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995); see also Murray Wci-
denbaum, The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax: Analysis and Comparisons, in FRONTIERS OF 
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on incomes, they would have to be apportioned to be constitu-
tionally valid. And if apportionment would be required for a 
proposed tax, the tax probably wouldn't be enacted: it's been 142 
years since Congress went to the trouble of apportioning a tax. 7 
All of this is a long-winded way of explaining why I'm dis-
cussing the Direct-Tax Clauses in an exchange on interpreting 
the Sixteenth Amendment. The process of interpreting the 
Amendment is inevitably also the process of interpreting the 
Clauses. You can't hope to understand the Amendment without 
understanding what it was a reaction to. 
The scope of the Amendment and the scope of the Clauses 
depend on the interpretation of two terms, "direct taxes" and 
"taxes on incomes." The Sixteenth Amendment doesn't matter, 
under any theory of interpretation, unless the Direct-Tax 
Clauses have some substance-unless, that is, the term "direct 
taxes" encompasses a significant body of levies.8 And the Direct-
Tax Clauses have no remaining substance today if every levy 
that might otherwise have been subject to the Clauses can be 
characterized as a "tax on incomes." 
My conclusions about the proper way to interpret the Di-
rect-Tax Clauses and the Sixteenth Amendment are simple: con-
stitutional provisions ought to be taken seriously, and we ought 
to resist interpretive principles that would have the effect of gut-
ting those provisions. Yes, the Direct-Tax Clauses took a pecu-
liar form, but they were intended to be serious limitations on the 
national taxing power. And, although the Amendment was in-
tended to cut back on the scope of the Clauses-to make an un-
apportioned income tax possible-it too should be interpreted in 
a way that takes the Clauses seriously. If, as I argue, the term 
"taxes on incomes" was intended to exempt only a particular 
(albeit important) category of taxes from apportionment, the 
apportionment rule has continuing effect for direct taxes that 
aren't taxes on incomes. 
TAX REFORM, supra, at 54. I'll not try to prove here that the flat tax and the USA tax 
would be consumption taxes (that is, they would be structured to exclude the savings 
component of income from the tax base, leaving only amounts spent on consumption). 
But no one seriously disagrees with that characterization; it was their universally under-
stood character that made the proposals attractive to supporters and anathema to detrac-
tors. 
7. The last apportioned direct tax was the Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, (12 Stat.) 
292. 
8. The Amendment was historically important regardless of the meaning of the 
Direct-Tax Clauses. Whether the Amendment had any legal significance or not, it was 
probably politically necessary to get an income tax enacted. 
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Because issues of constitutionality often merge with issues 
of desirability, especially in popular discussions, it's worth mak-
ing a couple of points to prevent misunderstanding of my argu-
ments. First, when I defend the significance of the Direct-Tax 
Clauses, I don't mean to suggest that I would have drafted limi-
tations on the taxing power in the way the founders did. My 
drafting preferences don't matter, nor do Professor Johnson's. 
Calvin Johnson and I are trying to understand the Constitution 
as it is, not as we wish it to be. 
In addition, my exchange with Professor Johnson isn't about 
the most desirable forms of taxation. The universes of desirable 
taxes and constitutional taxes overlap, but they aren't necessarily 
identical. It may be that my understanding of the relevant consti-
tutional provisions would prevent Congress from enacting forms 
of taxation that I would prefer, and it's certainly the case that the 
Constitution permits forms of taxation that Professor Johnson 
a.nd I find odious. None of that is relevant to the present discus-
sion. 
To set the stage, in Part I, I outline the relevant constitu-
tional structure. In Part II, I describe what I see as the funda-
mental differences (other than height and weight) between Pro-
fessor Johnson and me. In Part III, I discuss the interpretive 
principles that ought to control in understanding the Direct-Tax 
Clauses. In Part IV I do the same for the Sixteenth Amendment. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
AFFECTING "DIRECT" TAXATION: THE BASICS 
The Constitution's overall taxing power is broad: "The 
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Im-
posts and Excises."9 But two clauses in the Constitution limit 
congressional power to enact "direct taxes" by requiring that 
such taxes be apportioned among the states on the basis of popu-
lation. That's a tough requirement to meet: if your state has one-
tenth of the total population, it should bear one-tenth of the ag-
gregate direct-tax liability, regardless of the state's proportion of 
the national tax base. 10 
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
10. I'm referring to "aggregate direct-tax liability" to mean the aggregate for any 
particular direct tax. If Congress were to enact more than one direct tax requiring appor-
tionment, the apportionment would be done tax by tax, or so I assume. See U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
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If your state also has one-tenth of the relevant national tax 
base, apportionment presents no particular problem: your one-
tenth of the population will have to pay one-tenth of the total di-
rect-tax liability. You might dislike the particular tax, and you 
might dislike the way the tax burden is distributed among your 
state's citizens and residents, but you shouldn't feel that your 
state is being gouged. 
But suppose your state's share of the direct-tax base is only 
one-twentieth of the national total. Each taxed item in your state 
will be subject to tax at a rate double the otherwise applicable 
average, or Congress will have to come up with some other, 
equally klutzy mechanism to make the apportionment numbers 
come out right. Whatever the mechanism adopted, you and your 
fellow citizens of state X (particularly the citizens who might feel 
the pinch of a higher tax rate) are unlikely to see the tax as fair. 11 
Or if your state's share of the direct tax due is one-fifth of 
the national total? Each item will be subject to tax at a rate one-
half the otherwise applicable average-good for your state, but 
bad for others. If Congress went ahead with direct taxation in 
those circumstances, when there's significant geographical varia-
tion, the statute would look very different from what we're used 
to. 
This description is making apportionment sound more off-
putting than it really is because not all levies are apportioned. 
The Constitution effectively divides the tax universe into direct 
taxes, which must be apportioned (unless exempted by the Six-
teenth Amendment), and all other levies, which I'll call "indirect 
taxes." "Indirect taxes" isn't a constitutional term, but it's a 
shorthand way to refer to the "Duties, Imposts and Excises" -a 
subset of the "Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises" that Con-
gress has the "Power To lay and collect"-that, under Article I, 
section 8, must "be uniform throughout the United States." 12 
The uniformity rule has been interpreted to require only geo-
graphical uniformity for indirect taxes, 13 meaning that, "if a par-
ticular item is subject to tax, it must be taxed at the same rate 
II. For example, suppose we're talking about an income tax and suppose (unrealis-
tically, given the Sixteenth Amendment) that an income tax must be apportioned. Your 
average state resident will have to pay as much in income tax as is paid by the average 
person nationally-probably meaning the tax rates applicable in your state will double 
the national average-even though your average resident has only one half of the na-
tional per capita income. 
12. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1. 
13. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41,83-106 (1900). 
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throughout the United States, wherever it may be found." 14 (For 
the moment, I'm ignoring another limitation on both direct and 
indirect taxes, the Export Clause's prohibition against taxes or 
duties on "Articles exported."Y 5 
I've argued elsewhere that indirect taxes were generally un-
derstood to be those levies that are imposed on transfers of arti-
cles of consumption.16 The founders assumed that the burden of 
such taxes was shifted to the ultimate consumer. As a result, 
there's no incentive for the national government to raise an indi-
rect tax rate too high because, if it does so, revenue will actually 
decrease: would-be purchasers will buy something else instead, 
or will take other actions to avoid or evade tax liability. With this 
understanding, the founders thought that no limitation other 
than the uniformity rule was necessary to constrain indirect taxa-
tion. 
In contrast, direct taxes were understood not to be shiftable 
or avoidable-the burden was assumed to be borne by the party 
on whom the tax was imposed-and the potential for govern-
mental abuse was therefore greater. At some level, any tax is 
avoidable, of course-including levies that almost everyone con-
cedes to be direct. Suicide takes care of capitation tax obliga-
tions, and not buying real estate takes care of real-estate tax ob-
ligations. But the ease of avoidance is substantially greater when 
the choice is whether to buy a bushel of taxed wheat. 
Under the constitutional scheme, any national levy is sub-
ject to either the apportionment rule or the uniformity rule-one 
or the other. 17 And the logic of the structure is that both rules 
can't apply to the same levy. Geographically variable tax rates-
which wouldn't be permissible with a levy governed by the uni-
formity rule-are all but inevitable with an apportioned tax. 
(That's why the uniformity rule, by its terms, doesn't apply to 
"taxes.") In the unlikely event that a direct-tax base is absolutely 
\4. Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power of the Federal Gov· 
ernment, 41 TAX LAW. 3,10 (1987). 
15. See U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5; Erik M. Jensen, The Export Clause, 6 FLA. TAX 
REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Jensen, Export Clause]. 
\6. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": Are Consump· 
tion Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2393·97 (1997) [hereinafter Jensen, 
Apportionment]; Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the 
Meaning of "Incomes," 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1973-77 (2001) [hereinafter Jensen, Taxing 
Power]. 
\7. There might be a residual category of levies subject to neither rule, but no one 
has figured out what such a levy would be. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 16, at 
2341 and n.37. 
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uniform geographically (that is, the distribution of the tax base 
among the states correlates perfectly with population), the tax 
would seem to satisfy both the uniformity and apportionment 
rules. But only the apportionment rule would be technically ap-
plicable in that case. 
For the first century of the nation's existence, the direct-tax 
apportionment rule played an important but limited role. Con-
gress knew how to apportion a tax, and it explicitl(s did so with 
several real-estate taxes between 1798 and 1861. 8 Except for 
those direct taxes and a Civil War income tax, however, the na-
tional government generally relied for revenue on levies that 
were indirect, tariffs and excises. Furthermore, the understand-
ings had developed, based on dicta in the 1796 decision in Hylton 
v. United States, 19 that apportionment is required only when it's 
easy to do (that is, when it imposes no substantial limitation on 
the taxing power) and that the only direct taxes for which appor-
tionment is required are capitation taxes and taxes on real es-
tate?0 That didn't leave much of a role for apportionment. 
The Direct-Tax Clauses contain no language that would 
support either of the Hylton dicta-indeed, it's counterintuitive 
to think that a limitation on the taxing power should apply only 
when it has no limiting effects- but in several nineteenth cen-
tury cases, the Hylton dictum about capitation and real-estates 
taxes was restated as if it were scripture.21 Until 1895, each un-
apportioned tax evaluated by the Supreme Court was character-
ized as a duty, impost, or excise-subject to the uniformity rule 
but not requiring apportionment. For example, in 1881, the 
Court upheld the validity of the Civil War income tax against the 
claim that it was a direct tax that hadn't been properly appor-
18. See Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, (12 Stat.) 292; Act of Mar. 5, 1816, ch. 24, (3 
Stat.) 255; Act of Feb. 27, 1815, ch. 60, (3 Stat.) 216; Act of Jan. 9, 1815, ch. 21, (3 Stat.) 
164; Act of Aug. 2, 1813, ch. 37, (3 Stat.) 53; Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, (1 Stat.) 597. 
19. 3 U.S. 171 (1796) (holding that a tax on carriages wasn't direct and therefore 
didn't have to be apportioned). 
20. See id. at 174-75 (Chase, J.); id. at 177 (Paterson, J.); id. at 181, 183 (Iredell, J.); 
infra Part III.D.l. 
21. See, e.g., Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881) ("{D]irect taxes, 
within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that 
instrument, and taxes on real estate ... "); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. 331,348 (1875) (char-
acterizing an estate tax on real estate an as excise on passage of value, rather than a di-
rect tax on real-estate ownership); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, 543 (1869) (noting 
that direct taxes imposed to 1869 had been on real estate, and that "personal property, 
contracts, occupations, and the like, have never been regarded by Congress as proper 
subjects of direct tax"). 
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tioned. The income tax, said the Court, was "within the category 
of an excise or duty."22 
Then came the Supreme Court's two 1895 decisions in Pol-
lock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 23 which struck down an 1894 
income tax for violating the apportionment rule. (It took two de-
cisions because the Court left so many open questions the first 
time.) On the controlling issues, the Court split 5-4, and given 
the post-Hylton case law, the result in Pollock was striking. To 
many, Pollock was a disastrous break with precedent- "the 
Dred Scott decision of government revenue," wrote Edwin 
Seligman.24 
The Court actually made a noble effort to link its conclusion 
in Pollock to Hylton, concluding that there was no constitutional 
distinction between a tax on real estate and a tax on the income 
from real estate, but the tones of Hylton and Pollock were so dif-
ferent that the cases can be reconciled at only the most technical 
(and therefore misleading) level. In effect, by reconsidering the 
dictates of the Direct-Tax Clauses and by reconsidering the na-
ture of an income tax, Pollock dramatically extended the uni-
verse of taxes potentially subject to apportionment. 
After 1895 the Direct-Tax Clauses seemed important once 
again, but, despite Pollock, the idea of an income tax wasn't go-
ing to disappear. The income tax had become popular in Wash-
ington, and not only with Populist firebrands. Democrats and a 
few Republicans were critical of Congress's historical reliance on 
consumption taxes, generally excises and tariffs, to fund the gov-
ernment?5 Consumption taxes didn't hit the rich nearly hard 
enough, and, in the late nineteenth century, there were some in-
credibly rich, and very visible, people. The push for an income 
tax was a push for fairness in the tax system-taxes should be 
based on ability to pay, it was argued-and the roadblock 
thrown by Pollock turned out to be temporary?6 
22. Springer, 102 U.S. at 602; see also Scholey, 90 U.S. at 347 ("it is expressly de-
cided that the term ['direct taxes'] does not include the tax on income"). 
23. 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (determining that taxation of income from real estate is un-
constitutional), vacated by 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (extending same principle to income from 
personal property and concluding that entire 1894 income-tax statute was unconstitu-
tional). 
24. Edwin R.A. Seligman, THE INCOME TAX 589 (1911). Professor Ackerman 
compares Pollock to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Ackerman, supra note 
3, at5. 
25. There had been an income tax during the Civil War, but it was temporary. It 
continued in effect until1872. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1093-95. 
26. See id. at 1093-1107. 
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The Sixteenth Amendment was the national response to 
Pollock. The Amendment, which worked its way through Con-
gress in 1909 and was ratified in 1913, provides that "taxes on in-
comes, from whatever source derived," needn't be apportioned. 
The Amendment was necessary if only because it turned out to 
be politically impossible for Congress to attempt another income 
tax with Pollock still on the books: bucking a Supreme Court de-
cision by enacting a new statute was more than many congress-
men were willing to try, even if they thought Pollock horribly 
wrong. But with the Constitution amended, the Court's sensitivi-
ties were irrelevant. The Amendment made it possible for Con-
gress to enact the modern unapportioned income tax, with geo-
graphically uniform rates?7 
II. THE COMBAT ANTS: JENSEN VERSUS JOHNSON 
Some of my views about interpreting the Direct-Tax 
Clauses and the Sixteenth Amendment were obviously reflected 
in the way I described the basics in Part I above. I'll now make 
my positions on several areas of contention explicit and contrast 
them with what I understand to be Professor Johnson's views. 
Here in essence is what I think. (1) By requiring direct taxes 
to be apportioned among the states on the basis of population, 
the founders intended the Direct-Tax Clauses to have real effect 
in limiting the national tax power. (2) The Supreme Court's 
early gutting of the Clauses in Hylton, with dicta limiting the 
category of "direct taxes" to easily apportionable taxes and, 
more specifically, to capitation and real-estate taxes, was wrong. 
(3) The Court did a much better job when it reinvigorated the 
Clauses a century later in Pollock.28 ( 4) Because of the validity 
of the Court's result (if not all the reasoning) in Pollock, the Six-
teenth Amendment was critical in making the modern income 
tax (but only the income tax) possible.29 The bottom line: any tax 
27. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1107-28. This isn't to say the effects 
are the same throughout the country. States with higher per capita incomes will pay a 
disproportionately large per capita amount in income taxes. Indeed, one of the constitu-
tional challenges to the 1894 income tax, which applied only to incomes above $4,000, 
was that it was sectional in its effects. The burden was to be overwhelmingly borne by 
residents of a few northeastern, industrialized states. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra 
note 16, at 2367 n.173. 
28. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), vacated by 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
29. See Erik M. Jensen, The Constitution Matters in Taxation, 100 TAX NOTES 821, 
827-29 (2003) [hereinafter Jensen, Constitution Matters]; Jensen, Taxing Power, supra 
note 16, at 1107-28; Enk M. Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution: How to Read the Di-
rect-Tax Clauses, 15 J.L. & PoL. 689, 707-08 (1999); Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 
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that is a direct tax but not a "tax on incomes" must be appor-
tioned to be valid, and the universe of taxes potentially subject 
to apportionment isn't trivial. These taxes probably include, for 
example, a wealth tax and a direct-consumption tax. 
Contrarian that he is, Professor Johnson disagrees at every 
step. As I understand it, this is what he thinks. (1) The Direct-
Tax Clauses were nonsense-on-stilts from the beginning. (2) The 
Supreme Court properly gutted the Clauses in 1796, limiting 
their application to at most capitation and real-estate taxes. 
(3) The Pollock decisions were clearly wrong in 1895. (4) Be-
cause Pollock was wrong, the Sixteenth Amendment was sub-
stantively unnecessary. The real purpose of the Amendment was 
to make it politically possible to proceed with a new income-tax 
statute, not to create new constitutional law. The Amendment 
can be interpreted as if it had torn Pollock out of U.S. Reports: in 
Professor Johnson's view, the effect was to return the tax world 
to the pre-1895 understanding of the Direct-Tax Clauses, with 
Hylton once again in full glory. 
The direct-tax apportionment rule would get in Congress's 
way if it were taken seriously, and Professor Johnson does his 
dogged best to make sure that doesn't happen. If there might 
otherwise be doubt about the characterization of a proposed 
new tax, Johnson favors "manipulative expansion" of key consti-
tutional terms to circumvent the apportionment rule:30 "Given 
its rapid expansion, 'excise' should be understood as a malleable 
concept that a [c]ourt can use to avoid apportionment. ... 
'[I]ncome,' too, is a malleable concept that a court can use to 
avoid apportionment."31 For Professor Johnson, almost every 
national levy is an "excise" (that is, an indirect tax), a "tax on in-
comes," or maybe both-with no apportionment therefore re-
quired. 
In the passages I've quoted, Professor Johnson refers to 
courts as avoiding apportionment. If he is right, though, what 
this really means is that Congress can avoid apportioning taxes 
and not have to worry about being second-guessed by the judici-
ary. If the constitutional terms that seem to limit the taxing 
power are "inherently malleable,"32 they mean what Congress 
16, at 2375-77. 
30. Calvin H. Johnson, Purging Out Pollock: The Constitutionality of Federal 
Wealth or Sales Taxes, 97 TAX NOTES 1723, 1734 (2002). 
31. ld. at 1733. 
32. See Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 101 (1990) 
("[T]he common defense is an inherently malleable term the meaning of which must be 
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wants them to mean. If Congress says a levy is an "excise," 
Voila!, it's an excise. Or if Congress says a levy is part of a "tax 
on incomes," Voila!, it's a tax on incomes. The key phrases are 
effectively treated like "public use" and "general welfare"-
terms that were once thought to have judicially enforceable con-
tent, but are now left to Congress to define. 33 
And Professor Johnson takes his arguments about the insig-
nificance of the constitutional limitations on the taxing power 
farther than (almost) any other man has gone before.34 Although 
the Hylton Justices understood the term "direct taxes" to include 
capitation and real-estate taxes, as did all other founders of 
whom I'm aware, Professor Johnson suggests that real-estate 
taxes (and, more broadly, wealth taxes35) should today be ex-
empt from apportionment because of a "more general intent" 
evidenced at the founding. 36 Professor Johnson thinks that, in as-
suming a real-estate tax to be direct, the founders didn't under-
stand the logic of what they were doing. 
If the Direct-Tax Clauses don't apply to real estate, only 
capitation taxes remain subject to apportionment. And if by 
"capitation tax" we mean a lump-sum head tax, a capitation tax 
is automatically apportioned anyway (since the special countinB 
rules for slaves and Indians not taxed are no longer relevant). 
For Professor Johnson, the effect of the apportionment rule to-
day is therefore zilch, and, with the Direct-Tax Clauses' having 
left to the judgment of Congress. The same should apply to the meaning of income in the 
sixteenth amendment."). 
33. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 fn.2 (1987) ("The level of defer-
ence to the congressional decision is such that the Court has more recently questioned 
whether 'general welfare' is a judicially enforceable restriction at all") (citing Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976)); Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239 
(1984) ('"(W]hen the legislature has spoken (in defining 'public use'], the public interest 
has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive."') (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 
26, 32 (1954)). 
34. One exception is Professor Ackerman, who also doesn't like having the Consti-
tution interfere with his policy goals. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 3 ("Under the con-
stitutional regime inaugurated by the New Deal, there are no significant limits on the 
national government's taxing, spending, and regulatory powers where the economy is 
concerned-other than the requirement that government compensate owners if their 
property is taken for public purposes."). 
35. In the agrarian society of the late eighteenth century, a real-estate tax was the 
quintessential wealth tax. 
36. Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the Core of 
the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 70 (1998) ("Even considering land tax a 
'direct tax' makes the apportionment requirement contrary to the more general intent."). 
37. Even if a capitation tax could in theory be graduated, and Adam Smith made 
noises to that effect, the apportionment rule points toward a lump-sum head tax. See Jen-
sen, Apportionment, supra note 16, at 2392-93. 
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no substantive effect, the Sixteenth Amendment is also irrele-
vant. 
III. INTERPRETING THE DIRECf-TAX CLAUSES 
Surprisingly little of the disagreement between Professor 
Johnson and me has been about substantive tax principles. We 
might be able to fit accelerated depreciation into our constitu-
tional discussions, but that's not going to happen here. Most of 
our discussion has involved the proper interpretation of the con-
stitutional provisions. 
I think the Direct-Tax Clauses were serious constitutional 
provisions from the beginning, and they should be taken seri-
ously today. Professor Johnson doesn't. I think the Sixteenth 
Amendment should be understood as an important, but limited, 
carve-out from the Direct-Tax Clauses. Professor Johnson dis-
agrees about that, too. 
My starting proposition is that we should try to interpret 
any constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision in its most 
robust form. At a minimum, that means resisting to the death 
the conclusion that a provision is meaningless and can therefore 
be ignored. If your method of interpretation leads you to con-
clude that a provision is nonsensical-and that's effectively how 
Professor Johnson characterizes the Direct-Tax Clauses: "a rule 
too silly to enforce"38 -the appropriate response is to reconsider 
the method, not to accept the apparently nonsensical result. 
And there are two Direct-Tax Clauses in the Constitution. 
Some have argued that the Clauses therefore have extra effect,39 
but we don't need to go that far. At a minimum, the second ref-
erence to apportionment makes it clear the rule wasn't an after-
thought or an obvious mistake.40 
38. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1725. 
39. See, e.g., Arthur C. Graves, Inherent Improprieties in the Income Tax Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution, 19 YALE L.J. 505, 515 (1910) ("The qualification of di-
rect taxes is the only provision in the entire Constitution which appears twice in that in-
strument. This fact ought to teach us to hold it in still higher regard and to respect the 
more the earnestness and intent of the framers who placed it there."). 
40. The Clause in what became Article I, section 2 of the Constitution, tying appor-
tionment to both representation and direct taxation, was the subject of debate in July at 
the Convention. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 16, at 2386-89. But the second 
reference in section 9 seems to have been for purposes of completeness, to ensure that 
apportionment was in the list of limitations on congressional power. The language was 
added on the motion of George Read of Delaware near the end of the convention, on 
September 14, with no objection. Read was apparently concerned the government might 
use the direct-tax power to disproportionately impose levies on states that had been de-
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Professor Johnson would nonetheless have us conclude that 
two clauses in the Constitution should be interpreted in a way 
that deprives them of any significant effect. I'll now consider, 
and reject, several of his justifications for interpreting the Direct-
Tax Clauses so perversely: that the founders intended no signifi-
cant limitations on the taxing power, that the Clauses are non-
sensical in their operation, that the Clauses were inextricably 
linked to the odious system of slavery, and that we should defer 
to the founding-era Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Clauses in Hylton. On the last point I consider at length whether 
founding-era governmental bodies were generally scrupulous 
enough in observing constitutional niceties to deserve uncritical 
reverence today. (The answer is "no.") 
A. JOHNSON: "TAX WON" 
Creating a workable national revenue system after the de-
bacle of the Articles of Confederation was a critical reason for 
having a new constitution, and, at the Constitutional Conven-
tion, Professor Johnson says, "Tax won."41 The Constitution was 
a "pro-tax" document,42 and the founders therefore intended no 
significant limitations on the taxing power (other than the Uni-
formity and Export Clauses). 
This is a point on which Professor Johnson and I don't en-
gage because we see the world of 1787-1789 so differently. Pro-
fessor Johnson apparently views the Constitution-writing process 
as binary: taxes either won or lost, direct taxes either won or lost, 
the Federalists either won or lost. The intellectual battles in 
Philadelphia were ali-or-nothing, with the word "compromise" 
excised from delegates' vocabulary. 
But nothing in the record justifies Professor Johnson's one-
dimensional interpretation of history. Properly understanding 
the Constitution doesn't require that we choose between an 
unlimited (or nearly unlimited) taxing power and no taxing 
power at all. The Constitution was intended to strengthen the 
linquent under the requisitions system: "He was afraid that some liberty might otherwise 
be taken to saddle the States with a readjustment by this rule, of past Requisitions of 
Congs-and that his amendment by giving another cast to the meaning would take away 
the pretext." MADISON, SEPT. 14, 1787, IN CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS: THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1887 at 618 
(Max Farrand ed.) (1911). ' 
41. Calvin H. Johnson, Barbie Dolls in the Archeological Dig: Professor Johnson 
Responds, 100 TAX NOTES 832, 840 (2003). 
42. !d. at 838. 
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national taxing power, but let's put this in perspective. The "na-
tional" government had had no power to tax individuals under 
the Articles of Confederation; all it could do was requisition 
funds from the states. For tax to "win" in Philadelphia, it wasn't 
necessary to create an omnipotent taxing power. Tax "won" 
when the delegates agreed to something as simple as permitting 
the national government to levy duties on imports. 
Professor Johnson expects us to believe that "[n]o propo-
nent of this Constitution could have tolerated a hobble on fed-
eral revenue,"43 but that's crazy. An awful lot of founders, in-
cluding Federalists, insisted on restraints that Professor Johnson 
says were intolerable. His slogans don't even connect with the 
language of the Constitution, which includes the Uniformity 
Clause and the Export Clause as well as the two Direct-Tax 
Clauses-hobbles all. The constitutional context, Professor 
Owen Fiss has properly noted, was "defined by the desire to 
prevent abuses of the power of taxation,"44 and, without con-
straints on the national taxing power, the Constitution wouldn't 
have been ratified. 
Tax's victory wasn't total, and direct taxation's wasn't ei-
ther. Professor Johnson quotes many founders on the impor-
tance of the national government's ability to impose direct taxes. 
For example, he notes that "Washington's stubborn refusal to 
allow anything that goes to the prevention of direct taxation 
represents the Founders' intent."4 True enough; in that respect 
direct taxation "won." But the incontrovertible fact that the 
Federalists wanted the national government to have a direct-
taxing power doesn't mean that direct taxes were subject to no 
limitations. To repeat the obvious: the Direct-Tax Clauses are in 
the Constitution, twice, and they can't be dispensed with just be-
cause they're inconvenient. 
Finally, in tallying the results of the eighteenth-century tax 
wars, Johnson draws support for his expansive conception of the 
taxing power by noting that the Federalists generally "won" in 
Philadelphia and in the ratifying conventions and that the Anti-
Federalists generally lost.46 Of course the final document con-
formed more closely to the desires of constitutional supporters 
than to constitutional detractors. Who could disagree? But con-
43. /d. 
44. OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 
88-89 (1993). 
45. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1728. 
46. See id. at 1727. 
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stitution-writing isn't an either-or process, and the "winners" 
didn't get everything they wanted in undiluted form. 
For example, the Federalists generally opposed the Export 
Clause, which prevents Congress from taxing "Articles ex-
ported. "47 Among the formidable opponents were Alexander 
Hamilton, James Madison, Gouverneur Morris, George Wash-
ington, and James Wilson, but the Clause survived.48 And most 
Federalists didn't think the taxing power should be unlimited: 
Madison thought the direct-tax apportionment rule was "one of 
the safeguards of the Constitution."49 Even the strongest propo-
nents of a powerful national government didn't say in public that 
the government was to be unconstrained. Alexander Hamilton 
probably preferred an unlimited taxing power, and, in some pas-
sages in The Federalist, he suggested that only necessity, not con-
stitutional language, should limit that power. But Hamilton was 
a realistic politician, who wanted the Constitution ratified, and 
he also stressed protections against abuse. 50 To say that the Fed-
eralists "won" isn't to say that the Direct-Tax Clauses can be ig-
nored. 
B. BIZARRE RESULTS 
Professor Johnson is convinced that the founders didn't un-
derstand what they were doing with the Direct-Tax Clauses. He 
argues that they really didn't want to limit the direct-taxing 
power at all, a proposition that is disproved by the very existence 
of the Clauses. But he has a more serious claim as well, that the 
founders unknowinglX created a monster that, if given free rein, 
would devour Texas: 1 "Apportionment of direct tax turned out 
to be a rule too silly to enforce, in those cases in which the tax 
base is not equal per capita among the states."52 Presented with 
two badly broken constitutional clauses that would inevitably 
47. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 5. 
48. See Jensen, Exporl Clause, supra note 15, at 6-15. 
49. 4 ANNALS OF CoNG. 730 (1794) (describing why he was voting against the un-
apportioned carriage tax later at issue in Hylwn). 
50. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Willis 
ed., 1985) ("An actual census or enumeration of the people must furnish the rule; a cir-
cumstance which effectually shuts the door to partiality or oppression. The abuse of this 
power of [real-estate] taxation seems to have been provided against with guarded cir-
cumspection."). 
51. Let's assume arguendo that that would be a bad thing. 
52. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1725; see also id. at 1734 ("Apportionment is a silly 
and hobbhng reqUirement, as the Founders recognized in Hyllon, when the tax base is 
uneven."). 
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have produced bizarre results, he says, the Hylton Court acted in 
a statesmanlike way by slaying the monster. The Court did what 
it had to do. 
If there were no way to make sense of the Direct-Tax 
Clauses, I might be sympathetic to Professor Johnson's demand 
that the Clauses be discarded. If a provision has no discernable 
reason for existence or if it just can't work to effectuate any le-
gitimate purpose, then I suppose it has to go. But the founders 
weren't inept, the Clauses had their purposes, and the Clauses 
work in a defensible (albeit clunky) way. 
Professor Johnson is correct, of course, that the founders 
didn't understand all of the consequences of the provisions they 
created. The founders thought in general that the direct-tax ap-
portionment rule would prevent abuse-it would make direct 
taxes geographically "fair," among other things- but they didn't 
prepare spreadsheets to study how the rule would work in a lot 
of hypothetical situations. Furthermore, there probably was no 
consensus (there certainly wasn't unanimity) about all of the 
taxes to which the Direct-Tax Clauses might apply. 
But the appropriate response to criticisms of that sort is "So 
what?" Any good (or bad) lawyer can create uncertainty in the 
interpretation of any passage in any document. If unanimity 
were the criterion, no provision discussed in Constitutional 
Commentary would have any effect. We do the best we can. 
The most often quoted passage from Madison's notes in 
support of the idea that the founders were clueless is Rufus 
King's unanswered question on August 20: "Mr King asked what 
was the precise meaning of direct taxation? No one 
answ[ere]d."53 Although based on no evidence-who knows for 
sure why people don't speak?- the conventional wisdom is that, 
as Dwight Morrow explained in 1910, "Rufus King's question 
was not answered because no man in the Convention was able to 
answer it. He asked for a 'precise' definition of 'direct taxation.' 
As a matter of fact no man has yet satisfactorily answered that 
question. "54 
Morrow was a smart man, but most of us stop hoping for 
absolute precision in the definition of legal terms after two 
53. MADISON, AUG. 20,1787, IN CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND'S 
RECORDS: THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1887, at 350 (Max Farrand 
ed.) (1911). 
54. Dwight W. Morrow, The Income Tax Amendment, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 398 
(1910). 
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weeks of law school. We certainly don't discard terms just be-
cause our unrealistic hopes for precision are dashed. Besides, 
Morrow's interpretation isn't the only way to understand the si-
lence that followed King's question. Keith Dougherty has sup-
plied a more plausible explanation: "Lack of discussion reflected 
the virtual consensus on the issue and perhaps the limited 
thought put into the details. "55 Yes, the founders punted on the 
details- this was a Constitution they were writing- but they had 
a pretty good idea of what they wanted. 
Or did they? Because the founders hadn't thought about the 
details, Professor Johnson says, they didn't understand the ab-
surdity of the apportionment rule. As I've noted, one of John-
son's primary points is that " [a ]pportionment of direct tax 
turned out to be a rule too silly to enforce, in those cases in 
which the tax base is not equal per capita among the states."56 If 
the tax base isn't distributed equally, rates will probably have to 
differ among the states, and who could have intended that?57 
Just like the Justices in Hylton, Professor Johnson can conjure 
examples to make apportioned taxes look ridiculous,58 preserv-
ing apportionment only when it is easy. 
55. KEITH L. DOUGHERTY, COLLECTIVE ACTION UNDER THE ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION 151 (2001). We do know that, in other contexts, King acted as if he 
understood the meaning of "direct taxes." For example, at the Massachusetts ratifying 
convention, he stated, "It is a principle of this Constitution, that representation and taxa-
tion should go hand in hand." RUFUS KING, DEBATE IN THE MASSACHUSETTS 
RATIFICATION CONVENTION (1788), reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES: THE DEBATES 
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, at 36 (Jonathan Elliot ed.) (1836). When King later spoke out against 
requisitions, he again seemed to know what he was talking about: 
The first revenue will be raised from the impost, to which there is no objection, 
the next from the excise; and if these are not sufficient, direct taxes must be 
laid .... (I]f we mean to support an efficient federal government, which, under 
the old Confederation, can never be the case, the pro posed [sic] Constitution 
is ... the only one that can be substituted. 
/d. at 57. 
56. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1725. 
57. In Hylton, Justice Chase had written that 
(t]he Constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as direct taxes, but only such 
as Congress could Jay in proportion to the census. The rule of apportionment is 
only to be adopted in such cases, where it can reasonably apply; and the subject 
taxed, must ever determine the application of the rule. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174. 
Justice Iredell agreed: 
As all direct taxes must be apportioned, it is evident, that the Constitution con-
templated none as direct, but such as could be apportioned. If this (carriage tax] 
cannot be apportioned, it is, therefore, not a direct tax in the sense of the Consti-
tution. 
!d. at 181. 
58. In Hylton, Justice Chase wrote: 
Suppose two States, equal in census, to pay 80,000 dollars each, by a tax on car-
nages, of 8 dollars on every carriage; and in one State there are 100 carriages 
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But if apportionment applies only where the tax base is 
"equal per capita among the states," as Professor Johnson ar-
gues, apportionment applies only when it makes no difference. 
The rule is "enforced" when there's nothing to enforce! Even 
with the Supreme Court's blessing, that can't be the right way to 
interpret a constitutional provision. 59 
The apportionment rule, while cumbersome, has a core of 
good (or at least defensible) sense, as a limitation on the con-
gressional power to enact sectionally burdensome taxes.6° For 
the founders, the possibility of taxes targeted at particular sec-
tions of the country wasn't a trivial concern,61 and, by itself, the 
uniformity rule does nothing to prevent a tax directed at geo-
graphically concentrated items. 
Part-but only part-of the concern was slavery. The South 
was afraid that Congress might attack the peculiar institution by 
levying a tax on slaves, and the apportionment rule substantially 
lessened, if it didn't eliminate, that possibility. Slaves were in fact 
taxed as part of several apportioned direct taxes on real estate,62 
on the understanding that slaves were inextricably linked to the 
associated land, but no direct tax was ever levied on slaves alone. 
The rule nevertheless has application to any sectionally con-
centrated tax base, not just to slaves. Suppose a tax is imposed 
on the ownership of sleighs. Although rates may be the same 
throughout the country, so that the uniformity rule is satisfied, 
only the North will bear the burden of the tax-unless the tax is 
direct. If the tax is direct, however, the burden must also fall on 
states with a sleigh deficit-with the liability of any state de-
and in the other 1000. The owners of carriages in one State, would pay ten times 
the tax of owners in the other. A. in one state, would pay for his carriage 8 dol-
lars, but B. in the other state, would pay for his carriage 80 dollars. 
/d. at 174; see also id. at 181-82 (Iredell, J.); Johnson, supra note 30, at 1725 (arguing, for 
example, that, if apportionment were required with a carriage tax like that in Hylton, 
"the poor fool to drive the first carriage into Kentucky would have to bear Kentucky's 
entire state quota"). 
59. Professor Johnson approvingly quotes Alexander Hamilton's argument in Hyl-
ton: "[N]o construction ought to prevail calculated to defeat the express and necessary 
authority of the government." Johnson, supra note 30, at 1726. But you can't tell what 
the founders thought the necessary authority of the government was without considering 
the express limitations built into the Constitution. 
60. It has other purposes as well, including the general desire to constrain national 
power. I focus on the sectional taxation point because it makes the good sense of the rule 
apparent. 
61. See, e.g., Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 15, at 6-15 (2003) (noting that the 
primary purpose of the Export Clause was to prevent sectionally-targeted taxes on ex-
ports). 
62. See sttpra note 4. 
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pendent on its fraction of the national population, not the con-
centration of sleighs in that state. 
Although Professor Johnson emphasizes that the appor-
tionment rule, if applied, could lead to bizarrely different tax 
rates in different states,63 his argument misses the point of the 
Direct-Tax Clauses. Professor Johnson correctly assumes that 
having different rates in different states will generally be seen as 
an absurdity, but it's because the rule might lead to facially sus-
pect results that the rule has effect. 
The Clauses should mean that, in ordinary circumstances, a 
direct tax aimed at a sectionally concentrated tax base (that is, a 
base that isn't at least approximately proportionate to popula-
tion) won't be enacted. Who in Congress is going to vote for 
such a tax, except perhaps in an emergency like wartime, when 
revenue needs overwhelm other concerns? 
While you as congressman might initially be inclined to 
support a tax that seems to hit other states-let's get those Mon-
tanans, heh, heh-it's not as though you're going to be able to do 
that secretly (and it's not as though the Montana congressmen 
and others similarly situated are going to vote for the tax). And, 
if the proposed tax is direct, it would wind up hitting your con-
stituents as well: the apportionment rule ensures that regardless 
of the distribution of the tax base across the country (and even if 
you have few sleighs in your state), your constituents would have 
to pay their apportioned share of the total liability. How are you 
going to defend a vote for such a statute on the floor of Con-
gress, or to your constituents back home, or to anyone else? 
If Congress is inclined to use direct taxes at all (and even 
supporters of direct taxation thought the United States would 
rely on indirect taxation in the ordinary course of its business ),64 
the apportionment rule pushes Congress in the direction of im-
plementing only those direct taxes that have uniformly distrib-
uted bases-"equal per capita among the states," to use Profes-
sor Johnson's phrase. If the base of a proposed direct tax is 
"equal per capita among the states," the tax by definition will 
satisfy the apportionment rule, and it will be relatively easy to 
sell politically. For a sectionally concentrated tax base, however, 
63. Indeed, depending on how the taxed items are distributed, it could lead to 
bizarrely higher rates in poorer states. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 1725. 
64. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 16, at 2382-83. 
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the apportionment rule should help prevent enactment of the 
tax.65 
Professor Johnson would instead have the apportionment 
rule apply only if the tax base is uniformly distributed, when, by 
definition, there's no danger of sectional taxation. And the rule, 
he says, should have no application to cases in which nominally 
uniform taxes have sectionally disproportionate effects. That's 
backwards. 
Nothing that I have said means that direct taxation is impos-
sible. We shouldn't forget that Congress did in fact enact anum-
ber of apportioned direct taxes on real estate between 1798 and 
1861.66 Professor Johnson refers to the apportionment rule's op-
erating as a "tax killer," to make direct taxation impossible,67 but 
these statutes, which included complex mechanisms to ensure 
compliance with the apportionment rule, prove him wrong. The 
apportionment rule, taken seriously, makes direct taxation diffi-
cult, but not impossible. 
Perhaps one can find a constitutional provision that is so 
nonsensical that it should be discarded for that reason, but the 
Direct-Tax Clauses don't approach that standard of absurdity. 
One might disagree with the goal of cabining congressional 
power, or be indifferent to the purported dangers of sectional 
taxation, or find fault with the way the apportionment rule im-
plements its goals in a particular case. But by no standard is the 
rule "too silly to enforce." 
C. THE CONNECTION WITH SLAVERY 
Professor Johnson, Professor Ackerman, and others have 
pointed to the Direct-Tax Clauses' unfortunate connection with 
slavery as a reason for jettisoning the Clauses. As Professor 
Ackerman puts it, "there is no longer a constitutional point in 
enforcing a lapsed bargain with the slave power. "68 This is obvi-
ously supposed to be a discussion-stopper: suggest that the Di-
65. One hopes that such a tax wouldn't be enacted even without the apportionment 
rule, but the rule should clinch the case in the overwhelming majority of cases. 
66. See supra note 18. You can tell from the dates (1798,1813, 1815, 1816, and 1861) 
that these direct taxes were generally intended to raise revenue for war or the possibility 
of war. 
67. Johnson, supra note 41, at 832. 
68. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 58; see also id. at 31; Johnson, supra note 30, at 
1724-25 & 1734. 
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rect-Tax Clauses should be taken seriously, and you might be ac-
cused of indifference to slavery and racism.69 
Nonsense. I admit the obvious: the Clauses took the form 
they did, with the three-fifths counting rule for slaves, because of 
slavery. But the apportionment rule, which applies to representa-
tion as well as direct taxation, wasn't pro-slavery. Unfortunately it 
wasn't anti-slavery either, but it wasn't the unqualified evil that 
Professors Ackerman and Johnson think it was. 
In his notes on the Constitutional Convention, James Madi-
son described Gouverneur Morris's proposal of "proportioning 
direct taxation to representation," ultimately reflected in Article 
I, section 2, as having the "object [of) lessen[ing) the eagerness 
on one side, & the opposition on the other, to the share of Rep-
resentation claimed by the S. <Sothern> [sic] States on account 
of the Negroes."70 By tying apportionment to both representa-
tion and direct taxation, the rule had the effect of increasing the 
South's representation (by counting slaves as three-fifths of a 
person) but simultaneously increasing the South's share of any 
direct-tax liability (also by counting slaves as three-fifths of a 
person). 71 Any incentive the southern states might have had to 
overstate slave populations, so as to increase representation, 
would have come with a substantial cost: increased direct-tax li-
ability. This was a compromise that worked because it fully satis-
fied neither side, and, viewed in its entirety, the compromise 
wasn't pro-slavery. 
Madison discussed this point in Federalist 54. After noting 
that population would be used to govern both representation 
and direct taxation, he stressed that the rules are "by no means 
founded on the same principle."72 The tension is a good thing: 
As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the Congress 
will necessarily depend ... on the disposition, if not on the co-
69. After my first article on this subject, Professor Ackerman accused me of de-
fending the "legacy of racism." See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 30 n.l12. 
70. MADISON, JULY, 24, 1787, IN CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND'S 
RECORDS: THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1887, at 106 n. * (Max Far-
rand ed.) (1911). As readers of Constitutional Commentary undoubtedly know, but the 
person on the street almost always gets wrong, it was the slave states that wanted slaves 
counted as full persons for purposes of representation. 
71. Morris apparently didn't want the apportionment rule for direct taxation to sur-
vive; he "meant it as a bridge to assist over a certain gulph; having passed the gulph the 
bndge may be removed." MADISON, JULY, 24, 1787, IN CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 
2 FARRAND'S RECORDS: THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1887, at 106 
(Max Farrand ed.) (1911) (footnote omitted). It survived nonetheless. 
72. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 275 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Willis ed., 1985). 
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operation of the States, it is of great importance that the 
States should feel as little bias as possible to swell or to reduce 
the amount of their numbers .... By extending the rule to 
both objects, the States will have opposite interests which will 
control and balance each other and produce the requisite im-
. 1" 73 partla Ity. 
The compromise reflected in the Direct-Tax Clauses worked 
precisely because it was neither pro-slavery nor anti-slavery. 
As a result of the Civil War Amendments, the Constitution 
was stripped of its most egregious connections with slavery, in-
cluding the three-fifths rule. Discarding still other provisions be-
cause of a perceived slavery taint, as Professors Johnson and 
Ackerman want us to do, would expose the Constitution to a 
seemingly endless series of challenges. Where do we stop if we 
start unraveling the compromises that had some arguable con-
nection with slavery? Was provision A too closely tied to tainted 
provision B? How do we tell? And what about C, which at one 
point was discussed in connection with B? If all constitutional 
provisions are up for grabs, one despairs of being able to invoke 
closure.74 
With the apportionment rule, Professors Johnson and Ac-
kerman might respond, we don't have any difficulty figuring out 
what the compromise was. It's right there in Article I, section 2, 
with the three-fifths rule used both for direct taxation and for 
representation. But that fact hardly strengthens their case. Why 
is it that Professors Johnson and Ackerman see the taint of slav-
ery on only one side of the compromise (and, for that matter, 
only on the side that imposed a cost on slave states)? What prin-
ciple would permit us to view the apportionment rule for direct 
taxation as irredeemably tainted, but not the apportionment rule 
for representation, when the two rules are contained in precisely 
the same passage? 
I take it that Professors Johnson and Ackerman don't favor 
reconfiguring representation in the House of Representatives 
73. !d. at 279. 
74. I don't mean to suggest that the Constitution was so tainted that the entire 
document was irredeemable. I reject Justice Thurgood Marshall's argument that Justice 
Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), accurately described the 
founders' moral and constitutional understanding of African-Americans. Compare Thur-
good Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1987), with Erik M. Jensen, Commentary: The Extraordinary Revival of Dred Scott, 66 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1988). But in a document reflecting a multitude of compromises, it is 
often impossible to determine which provisions were tradeoffs for which. 
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because of the slavery taint, but why not? If we want to think in 
these terms-l'd prefer not to-the apportionment rule for rep-
resentation was also part of a "lapsed bargain with the slave 
power."75 The Johnson-Ackerman position seems to be result-
oriented thinking at its worst: see a taint when you think it sup-
ports a result you want, and see no taint otherwise. That isn't a 
helpful canon of constitutional interpretation. 
Despite its tangential connection with slavery, the direct-tax 
apportionment rule had independent reasons for existence, such 
as deterring sectionally directed taxation. Given the founders' 
fears of national taxing power, it's hard to imagine that the Con-
stitution would have included no limitations on direct taxation 
even if slavery had not existed. The dangers of sectional taxation 
didn't begin with slavery and didn't disappear with the end of 
slavery. Yes, the limitation actually selected took a peculiar 
form, but that's not a reason for disregarding it. 
D. DEFERENCE TO THE FOUNDING "GIANTS": THE 
UNDESERVED INFLUENCE OF HYLTON 
Perhaps Professor Johnson's strongest argument for dis-
counting the Direct-Tax Clauses is that the Supreme Court's 
1796 decision in Hylton v. United States76 demonstrates that, 
whatever language was used in the Constitution, the founders in-
tended the Clauses to be toothless. In this part of the article, I'll 
question the supposition that what the Court did in 1796 or, 
more generally, what founders-in-power did defines the original 
understanding of the Constitution. 
1. Hylton 
In Hylton, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an un-
apportioned carriage tax, enacted in 1794, against the challenge 
that the tax was direct. 77 By any standard, Hylton was a great 
case-extraordinary drama in oral argument, with former Treas-
ury Secretary Alexander Hamilton representing the government, 
the taxing power of the new nation at issue, and the Supreme 
Court facing for the first time the question whether it could 
overturn a congressional enactment on constitutional grounds. 78 
75. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 58. 
76. 3 U.S.171 (1796). 
77. See Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 45, (I Stat. 373) 373-75. 
7~. ,Hylton doesn't get the good press that Marbury v. Madison does because Hyl-
ton d1dn t stnke down the carriage tax. For the posture of the case to have made any 
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The conclusion about the carriage tax was important at the 
time-the tax was a significant revenue-raiser-but it was the 
side dishes that made Hylton a sumptuous feast. In two sets of 
dicta, the Hylton Justices concluded that apportionment should 
apply only when it's easy to do (that is, when the tax base is uni-
formly distributed across the country),79 and that only capitation 
taxes and taxes on real estate are direct. In Justice Chase's 
words, the direct taxes "contemplated by the Constitution, are 
only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard 
to properfl, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on 
LAND."8 Justice Iredell agreed: "In regard to other articles, 
there may possibly be considerable doubt."81 While Justice 
Paterson was unwilling to concede that no other taxes could be 
direct, he too concluded that capitation and real-estate taxes 
were the "principal" examples.82 
Professor Johnson is a fervent defender of Hylton's dicta.83 
The Court in 1796 was made up of founders-"giants [who] 
walked upon the earth,"84 in Johnson's phrase-and what they 
said in Hylton was unquestionably correct: those Justices "knew 
the Constitution far better than we do."85 Marjorie Kornhauser 
has stated the Hylton-as-gospel argument in this more restrained 
way: "The gap in time between Hylton and the Constitution is 
small, the flaw in the Articles of Confederation well-known. 
Also persuasive is the fact that four of the justices in the Hylton 
case had been drafters or ratifiers of the Constitution. "86 
Of course we should care what the Supreme Court Justices 
wrote in their separate opinions in Hylton, and we should take 
those positions into account in trying to discern original under-
sense, however, the Court must have concluded that it had the power to invalidate the 
tax. 
79. See supra notes 20 and 58 and accompanying text. The assumption, without any 
data one way or the other, was that carriages weren't uniformly distributed. 
80. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 175. 
81. Id. at 183. 
82. Id. at 177. 
83. It's presumably only the dicta that matter to Professor Johnson. The Third 
Congress, also filled with giants, passed the carriage tax over complaints that it was di-
rect. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 185-86 (1997). And George Washington signed the bill. Those who 
believe that whatever founders-in-power did was constitutional don't need the Supreme 
Court to conclude that the carriage tax was valid. 
84. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1726. 
85. Id. 
86. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constit!itional Meaning of Income and the Income 
Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 22 (1992) (footnote omitted). 
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standing. The Hylton opinions are relevant data. The case is 
d ~ nevertheless grossly overrate for many, many reasons. 
To begin with, I'm skeptical that the Hylton Justices knew 
the Constitution better than we do. They had firsthand knowl-
edge of certain events, but they couldn't bounce around the 
country to attend multiple ratifying conventions, and they didn't 
have access to C-Span. We have available many primary sources 
that most members of the founding generation were unaware of. 
And why would we think that the Hylton Justices knew the 
Constitution better than other founders? It's not as though there 
was unanimity in constitutional interpretation, even among those 
who supported the Constitution. Representative James Madison, 
for example, voted against the carriage tax at issue in Hylton be-
cause he thought it would "break down one of the safeguards of 
the Constitution. "88 The Justices got the final say on the carriage 
tax, and threw in the dicta as well, but that was by reason of their 
power, not by power of their reasoning.89 
Most important, the Hylton Justices didn't tie their dicta to 
the critical primary source-the Constitution itself. It's more 
than a little peculiar to say we're deferring to the "founders" by 
adopting an interpretation that guts two constitutional provi-
sions. If apportionment is to be applied only when it makes no 
difference, what's the point of the Direct-Tax Clauses? (The 
Clauses were designed to create incentives for Congress to im-
pose only direct taxes with bases that are uniformly distributed, 
but that's different from saying the rule should be applied only 
in that situation.) And if only two categories of taxes were in-
volved, why didn't the drafters just say that, rather than using 
the phrase "Capitation, or other direct, Tax" in Article I, sec-
tion 9? 
What's most bewildering about Hylton is that the dictum 
about capitation and real-estate taxes apparently leaves the Di-
rect-Tax Clauses with no relevance to forms of taxation devel-
oped after 1787. Any unapportioned tax is constitutional just be-
cause the founders failed to mention it? That's an absurd way to 
interpret a constitutionallimitation.90 
87. This is largely a discussion between proponents of an unlimited taxing power 
and those who see constraints on that power, but, amazingly, everyone apparently ac-
cepts the relevance of original understanding to the resolution of that issue. 
88. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (1794 ). 
~9. Cf Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are 
not fmal because we are mfalhble, but we are infallible only because we are final."). 
90. This is a classic example of why dicta shouldn't control in later cases: the Jus-
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There was obviously a lot going on in 1796 other than close 
legal reasoning. The early Supreme Court was very different 
from the type of Court we take for granted today. Rather than 
seeing the Court as a check on the other branches, the Hylton 
Justices (Federalists allJ viewed their function as supporting the 
Federalist government. 1 Indeed, Hylton was so clearly a phony 
dispute, with manufactured "facts," that it's hard to see why the 
Court decided this case except to make a statement about Fed-
eralist power.92 
Whatever the Hylton Court said, we must test our interpre-
tation of the Direct-Tax Clauses against the language and struc-
ture of the Constitution and against other founders' understand-
ing of the same provisions. On those grounds, the Hylton Court 
was wanting. And, as I shall now argue, it wasn't just the Su-
preme Court in the early years of the Republic that played fast 
and loose with constitutional requirements. Whether it's the 
1790s or the twenty-first century, it isn't a good idea to rely on 
those in power to define the limits of their power.93 
2. Early Legislative Practice 
Professor Johnson's "giants" weren't only on the Supreme 
Court in the 1790s; they were also in the executive branch and in 
Congress. We ought to be able to get an idea of the founders-in-
power as interpreters of the Constitution by looking at legisla-
tion as well as adjudication. Everyone knows the insensitivities 
tices didn't consider the effect of their statements on future taxes because they didn't 
have to. But this example is even worse than usual because there was no one on the 
Court skeptical enough of congressional power to push the Justices to be more careful in 
their language. The practice of writing opinions seriatim also didn't advance the cause of 
linguistic precision. 
91. See William R. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT 
BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 292, 315 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998) (noting that "jus-
tices of the early Supreme Court simply did not view their positions the way modern jus-
tices do"); Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1079 n.115. 
92. Hylton claimed to have 125 carriages for his own use (more "than then existed 
in Virginia." Edward B. Whitney, The Income Tax and the Constitwion, 20 HARV. L. 
REV. 280, 283 n.l (1907)), because the threshold amount required for Supreme Court 
review was $2000 (125 carriages with tax and penalties of $16 per carriage.) Even if be-
lieved, the phony claim shouldn't have worked: for jurisdictional purposes, the dollar 
amount at issue was supposed to exceed $2000, see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, (1 
Stat. 73) 84 and the parties had agreed that any liability of Hylton's could be discharged 
for sixteen dollars. See Hylton, 3 U.S. at 172. 
93. Cf Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616 n.3 (1992) ("[P]ublic officials, no matter 
when they serve, can turn a blind eye to constitutional principle.") (Souter, J ., concur-
ring). 
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evidenced by the Alien and Sedition Acts,94 but they're too easy. 
I'll examine an early tax statute, from the Fifth Congress in 1797, 
to demonstrate what we should have known anyway: even with 
taxation, giants can act in constitutionally suspect ways.95 
First, some background: The Export Clause provides that 
"No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any 
State."96 The Clause was an important part of the Constitution; 
without it, several southern states, worried that export levies 
might be targeted against the South, wouldn't have supported 
the Constitution.97 And Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury 
v. Madison used the Export Clause to defend the idea that "[qn 
some cases ... the constitution must be looked into by judges": 8 
It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles 
exported from any state." Suppose a duty on the export of 
cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover 
it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? ought the 
judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only see the 
law?99 
Marshall wrote this in 1803, six years after the statute I'll exam-
ine, but that's beside my point. Marshall was stating the obvious: 
the Export Clause absolutely forbids certain forms of taxation. 
Chief Justice Marshall used easy cases to make the case for 
judicial review, not to explicate the boundaries of the Export 
Clause. The doctrine of substance-over-form was known, at least 
at a rudimentary level, at the time of the founding; it's hard to 
imagine that the Clause was intended to prohibit only the most 
obvious of export levies. In a later case under the Import-Export 
Clause, 100 Marshall raised a hypothetical that he thought had a 
clear answer: If exports can't be taxed, could government instead 
tax exporters? "Would government be permitted to shield itself 
from the just censure to which this attempt to evade the prohibi-
tions of the constitution would expose it, by saying that [an oc-
cupational tax] was a tax on the person, not on the article, and 
94. See Act ofJuly 6, 1798, ch. 66, (1 Stat.) 577; Act ofJuly 14, 1798, ch. 74, (1 Stat.) 
596. 
95. The 1797 Act wasn't just a nuts-and-bolts statute, of course. The extent of the 
taxing power was a serious issue in the late eighteenth century, and the 1797 Act was a 
serious revenue-raiser at a time when war with France was possible. 
96. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 5. 
97. See Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 15, at 6-15. 
98. 5 U.S. 137, 179 (1803). 
99. !d. 
100. U.S. CON ST. art. I,§ 10, cl. 2. 
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that the legislature had a right to tax occupations?" 101 Of course 
not. 
Congress in 1797 nevertheless approved "An Act laying Du-
ties on stamped Vellum, Parchment and Paper," titled to suggest 
that duties were being laid on documents, rather than associated 
goods. 102 At least three provisions in the Act were questionable 
when tested against the Export Clause's prohibition against 
taxes on "Articles exported," and one, dealing with taxes on bills 
of lading, was so clearly unconstitutional as to be laughable. 
a. Taxes on Bills of Lading 
Among other things, the 1797 Act imposed a tax of ten 
cents on "[a)ny note or bill of lading, for any goods or merchan-
dise to be exported, if from one district to another district of the 
United States, not being in the same State"; or, if the goods were 
"to be exported to any foreign port or place," the tax was 
twenty-five cents. 103 The Act thus taxed bills of lading for "goods 
to be exported to any foreign port or place" at a rate higher than 
that applicable to domestic bills. 
Careful drafting by giants? First, note the apparent assump-
tion, reflected in the statutory language, that goods moving from 
one state to another are being "exported." Many states main-
tained a sense of independence in the republic's early years, but 
the understanding that interstate commerce involved exporta-
tion was almost certainly wrong in 1797. In any event, it long a&_o 
disappeared as a possible interpretation of the Export Clause.1 
More important, consider the merits of the tax. It was un-
questioned that exported goods as such couldn't be taxed. The 
tax on bills of lading wasn't measured by the value or volume of 
exported goods, but that's irrelevant for Export Clause purposes. 
A tax of ten cents per shipment of exported cotton is as invalid 
under the Clause as a tax of one cent per pound or a tax of one 
cent per dollar of assessed value. 105 
Does a tax that clearly affects exportation become constitu-
tionally acceptable if levied on paperwork associated with ex-
ported articles instead of on the articles themselves? To be sure, 
101. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419,445 (1827). 
102. Act of July 6,1797, ch. 11, § 1, (1 Stat.) 527. 
103. !d. at 528. 
104. It's now clear the reference is "only to exportation to foreign countries." United 
States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1,13 (1915). 
105. See Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 15, at 18-19. 
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the late eighteenth century was a more formalistic time than to-
day. The tax wasn't challenged in court, and, when the 1797 Act 
was repealed after five years, it wasn't because of perceived con-
stitutional problems. 106 In addition, as late as 1901, four Supreme 
Court Justices voted to uphold the constitutionality of such a 
tax. 107 So maybe a tax on bills of lading wasn't as blatant a viola-
tion of the Export Clause as a tax imposed directly on exported 
goods would have been. 
Maybe. But the 1797 tax was the equivalent of taxing the air 
surrounding an exported article, and it doesn't take much sophis-
tication to see that if such a tax isn't prohibited by the Export 
Clause, the Clause is a nullity. The Clause would prohibit only 
the most obvious sort of taxes, and thus give free rein to Con-
gress to avoid its limitations. The Fifth Congress legislated with 
the Clause in mind-otherwise it simply would have taxed the 
goods- and it's hard to see this part of the 1797 Act as anything 
other than a transparent attempt to circumvent the Clause. 
Indeed, that's the way the Supreme Court later character-
ized a similar tax enacted in 1898. In the 1901 case of Fairbank v. 
United States, 108 the Supreme Court considered a wartime stamp 
tax of ten cents on, among other things, "[b]ills of lading ... for 
any goods, merchandise, or effects, to be exported from a port or 
place in the United States to any foreign port or place." 109 
Not surprisingly, the Court invalidated the 1898 tax in its 
application to exports. Defending the tax, the government had 
argued that the actions of the Fifth Congress confirmed the con-
stitutionality of levies of this sort. The Court disagreed: "[W]hen 
the meaning and scope of a constitutional provision are clear, it 
cannot be overthrown by legislative action, although several 
times repeated and never before challenged." 110 The substance 
of the tax was apparent: "a stamp duty on a bill of lading is in ef-
fect a duty on the article transported." 111 Fairbank echoed a 
106. See Henry Carter Adams, Taxation in the United States 1789-1816, in JOHN 
HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE , SECOND SERIES 
V-VI 5, 57 (Herbert B. Adams ed., 1884) ("[U]pon the accession of Jefferson ... , it was 
endeavored to change radically the financial policy of the United States .... [I]n 1802, all 
mternal and direct taxes were abolished .... "). 
107. See infra notes 108 and 110 and accompanying text. 
108. 181 u.s. 283 (1901) . 
. 109. Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, (30 Stat. 448) 459 (Schedule A: Stamp Taxes). 
B1lls of lading for domestic shipping were subject to only a one cent tax. /d. at 459. 
110. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 312. 
Ill. /d. at 294. 
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similar point that Chief Justice Roger Taney had made in the 
1860 case of Almy v. California: 112 
[A] tax or duty on a bill of lading, although differing in form 
from a duty on the article shipped is in substance the same 
thing; for a bill of lading, or some written instrument of the 
same import, is necessarily always associated with every 
shipment of articles of commerce from the ports of one coun-
try to those of another. 113 
Congress couldn't burden exports through a tax on exported ar-
ticles, and that's exactly what it had done with the tax at issue in 
Fairbank, albeit surreptitiously. 
I find it hard to believe, but the government did convince 
four Justices in Fairbank that the tax was valid. Adopting an in-
credibly formalistic position, Justice Harlan wrote that "stamp 
duties were imposed specifically for and in respect of the vellum, 
parchment or paper upon which was written or printed a bill of 
lading for goods or merchandise to be exported to foreign coun-
tries. "114 The dissenters cited the 1797 Act and a similar 1862 
statute, 115 neither of which had been challenged judicially, to 
support the idea that such a tax was constitutional. 116 The dis-
senters had prior practice on their side, but common sense 
pointed in the other direction. 
If the 1797 tax on bills of lading was as blatantly defective as 
I've suggested, why didn't someone challenge its constitutional-
ity? The practice of running to the courthouse hadn't yet been 
perfected in the late eighteenth century, but even if it had been, 
such a challenge would have been pointless. The judiciary, in-
cluding the Supreme Court, was hopelessly beholden to the rest 
of the Federalist government. Judicial silence on the constitu-
tionality of all aspects of the 1797 Act reflected nothing more 
than the strength of the ties that had been exhibited the year be-
fore in Hylton. 
112. 65 U.S. 169 (1860) (interpreting the Import-Export Clause). 
113. /d. at 174. 
114. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 315 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
115. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, (12 Stat.) 432, continued by Act of June 30, 1864, 
(13 Stat. 223) 291, repealed by Act of June 6,1872, ch. 315, (17 Stat. 230) 256. 
116. See Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 306-12. 
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b. Taxes on Export Insurance 
It wasn't just the tax on bills of lading that marred the 1797 
Act. The Act contained other suspect provisions as well, includ-
ing a stamp duty on 
any policy of insurance ... , whereby any ships, vessels or 
goods going from one district to another in the United States, 
or from the United States to any foreign port or place, shall 
be insured, to wit, if going from one district to another in the 
United States, twenty-five cents; if going from the United 
States to any foreign port or place, when the sum for which 
insurance is made shall not exceed five hundred dollars, 
twenty-five cents; and when the sum insured shall exceed five 
hundred dollars, one dollar. 117 
The Fifth Congress knew the duty had export implications: if a 
ship carried exported articles, the insurance policy would relate, 
at least in part, to exported articles. 
The 1797 Act was evaluated by no contemporaneous court. 
But in 1915 the Supreme Court rejected a similar tax, as applied 
to exports, in Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co. v. United 
States, 118 and the 1915 Court didn't seem to think the issues were 
difficult. Furthermore, in 1996, in United States v. International 
Business Machines Corp., 119 yet another case involving a tax on 
export insurance, the Court backhandedly blessed Thames & 
Mersey by refusing to reconsider its earlier decision. 120 
As the Court said in 1915, and as Congress knew in 1797, 
exporting valuable goods without insurance is almost inconceiv-
able. Insurance is "an integral part of the exportation." 121 
Thames & Mersey concluded that the tax on insurance premiums 
was "so directly and closely related to the 'process of exporting' 
that the tax is in substance a tax upon the exportation." 12 
A tax on export insurance is a harder case under the Export 
Clause than a tax on bills of lading, but not by much. 123 Never-
117. Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, (1 Stat. 527) 527. 
118. 237 U.S. 19 (1915). The tax applied to insurance "upon property ... whether 
against peril by sea or on inland waters," measured by the "amount of premium charged, 
one-half of one cent on each dollar or fractional part thereof." Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 
448, (30 Stat. 448) 461. 
119. 517 U.S. 843 (1996). 
120. For a full treatment of the Court's bewildering treatment (really non-treatment) 
of important issues in IBM, see Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 15, at 17-35. 
121. Thames & Mersey, 237 U.S. at 26. 
122. /d. at 25. 
123. Dissenting in IBM, Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg thought the two situations 
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theless, in IBM, dissenting Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg wrote 
that the 1797 Act should be given controlling weight in deter-
mining the original understanding of the Export Clause, and 
therefore in evaluating the constitutionality of a similar modern 
tax on insurance: "We have always been reluctant to say a stat-
ute of this earll origin offends the Constitution, absent clear in-
consistency."12 Besides, the IBM dissenters noted, the Thames 
& Mersey Court was apparently unaware of the 1797 Act and 
therefore might have decided the case differently if it had known 
what the Fifth Congress had done. 125 
Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg were looking at early 
American history through rose-colored glasses. They rejected 
the idea that the Fifth Congress had been trying "to circumvent 
the Export Clause." In their view, "[t]he early Congresses were 
scrupulous ... by making specific exemptions for exports in laws 
imposing general taxes on goods. Their refusal to grant exporters 
similar exemptions from insurance taxes indicates that those 
taxes were not viewed as equivalent to taxes on goods."126 Yes, 
early Congresses were often scrupulous, but the Justices must 
not have studied the 1797 Act itself very carefully. Congress in 
1797 tried to destroy the Export Clause, not to adhere to it. 
c. Taxes on Charter Parties 
I'm not yet done with the 1797 Act. The Act included still 
another provision with questionable status under the Export 
Clause, a tax of one dollar on "any charter-party"127 -generally a 
contract for the lease of a vessel, which could include a lease for 
carrying cargo from the United States to foreign ports. Instead 
of imposing a tax directly on exported goods, Congress slapped a 
could be distinguished. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 876-77. 
124. !d. at 875. 
125. !d. at 877. 
126. !d. at 876 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, §51, (1 Stat. 199) 210-11 (tax on 
distilled spirits); Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 51,§ 14, (1 Stat. 384) 387 (tax on snuff andre-
fined sugar)). Section 51 of the 1791 Act, for example, provided that 
if any of the said spirits [otherwise subject to the levy] shall, after the last day of 
June next, be exported from the United States to any foreign port or place, 
there shall be an allowance to the exporter or exporters thereof, by way of 
drawback, equal to the duties thereon, according to the rates in each case by 
this act imposed .... 
Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 15, (1 Stat.) 210; see also Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 51§ 14, (1 
Stat. 384) 387 (providing similar drawback). This was an example of scrupulousness. In 
fact, refunding duties paid on spirits not earmarked for exportation at the time of distilla-
tion was more generous than modern understanding requires. See Jensen, Export Clause, 
supra note 15, at 60-63. 
127. Act of July 6,1797, ch. 11, § 1, (1 Stat. 527) 527. 
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levy on ships carrying the goods, or, more precisely, on paper-
work associated with the arrangements for such ships. 
As was true with the other 1797 taxes, the constitutionality 
of a tax on charter-parties as it applied to exports wasn't tested 
until much later. In 1915, the Supreme Court struck down a simi-
lar measure in United States v. Hvoslef, 128 a companion case to 
Thames & Mersey. 129 The HvoslefCourt thought this was a slam-
dunk issue. It's difficult to imagine anything more "integrally re-
lated" to exportation than contracts to charter ships that will 
carry exported articles: "The charters were for the exportation; 
they serve no other purpose. A tax on these charter parties was 
in substance a tax on the exgortation; and a tax on the exporta-
tion is a tax on the exports." 0 
At bottom, the Hvoslef Court concluded that it was neces-
sary to reject a tax on charter parties if the Export Clause was to 
be protected: 
This prohibition ... is designed to give immunity from taxa-
tion to property that is in the actual course of such exporta-
tion .... This constitutional freedom, however, plainly in-
volves more than mere exemption from taxes or duties which 
are laid specifically upon the goods themselves. If it meant no 
more than that, the obstructions to exportation which it was 
the purpose to prevent could readily be set up by legislation 
nominally conforming to the constitutional restriction but in 
ff "d" 0 131 e ect overn mg It. 
Just so. And it was just as true in 1797, when congressional "gi-
ants" threw a constitutional limitation to the winds. 
128. 237 U.S. 1 (1915) (evaluating Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, § 6, (30 Stat. 448) 
451, 460). Section 6 of the Act specified that a tax be imposed on the "things mentioned 
and described in Schedule A," and Schedule A included "charter party," defined as a 
[c)ontract or agreement for the charter of any ship, or vessel, or steamer, or any 
letter, memorandum, or other writing between the captain, master, or owner, or 
person acting as agent of any ship, or vessel, or steamer, and any other persons 
or persons, for or relating to the charter of such ship, or vessel, or steamer, or 
any renewal or transfer thereof .... 
/d. at 460; see Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 16. 
129. As in Thames & Mersey, the 1915 Court wasn't made aware of the similar pro-
vision in the 1797 Act. 
130. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 17. 
131. /d.at13. 
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d. Post-Mortem on the 1797 Act 
Nobody seems to care much about the Export Clause these 
days,132 but people did in the late eighteenth century. And unless 
we assume that the founders were so formalistic as to be mind-
less, the 1797 Act was an obvious constitutional outrage. The 
Act demonstrates that the founding generation was perfectly ca-
pable of bending constitutional rules beyond the breaking point. 
If one wanted to continue to trash the Fifth Congress (I think it's 
lots of fun), one could find other constitutionally suspect provi-
sions in the same piece of legislation. 133 
Perhaps I'm being too harsh on the Fifth Congress and on 
founders-in-power more generally. Maybe the giants simply mis-
understood the limitations of the Export Clause (and maybe the 
Hylton Justices simply misunderstood the significance of the Di-
rect-Tax Clauses). I don't think so, but genuine misunderstand-
ings can happen. A misunderstanding is still a misunderstanding, 
however, no matter how genuine, and there's no reason to defer 
to the genuine misunderstandings of prior generations. 
3. How Hylton Does Matter: Taxes on Real Estate (and 
Other Items of Wealth) 
I've been arguing that the deference shown over the years 
to Hylton has been misguided, and, more generally, that we 
shouldn't take actions of founders-in-power as incontestably de-
fining original understanding. One final point before moving to 
the Sixteenth Amendment: Professor Johnson has argued that 
we should steg back to try to discern a "more general intent" of 
the founders. 4 Had they only known how unworkable the ap-
132. Except for the Supreme Court, which decided two cases under the Clause in the 
1990s, both times striking down federal taxes as they applied to exportation. See United 
States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996); United States v. 
United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998). 
133. For example, the Act included a legacy tax, a stamp tax for 
any receipt or other discharge for or on account of any legacy left by any will or 
other testamentary instrument, or for any share or part of a personal estate di-
vided by force of any statute of distributions, the amount whereof shall be 
above the value of fifty dollars, and shall not exceed the value of one hundred 
dollars, twenty-five cents; where the amount thereof shall exceed the value of 
one hundred dollars and shall not exceed five hundred dollars, fifty cents; and 
for every further sum of five hundred dollars, the additional sum of one dollar. 
Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, (1 Stat. 527) 527. Estate taxes and inheritance taxes are 
today assumed not to be direct taxes, but that's partly because the Supreme Court cited 
the 1797 Act as support for the constitutionality of such an unapportioned tax. See 
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41,56 (1900) (finding support in the 1797 Act for congres-
sional power to enact an unapportioned estate tax). 
134. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 70. 
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portionment rule was, Professor Johnson says, they would have 
concluded that taxes on real estate should not be subject to ap-
portionment. Hylton's dicta didn't go far enough in gutting the 
Direct-Tax Clauses. 
This point is important because Professor Johnson uses it to 
argue that wealth taxes, properly understood, shouldn't have 
been considered direct taxes by the founders. If that's right, an 
unapportioned tax on wealth would be permissible today, 
whether or not a wealth tax would qualify as a "tax on incomes" 
under the Sixteenth Amendment. 135 
But that isn't a position that can be reconciled with any rea-
sonable conception of original understanding. It's true, as Pro-
fessor Johnson argues, that the founders understood taxation of 
wealth to be within congressional power. 136 (All direct taxes were 
within Congress's power.) As far as I can tell, however, everyone 
who discussed direct taxes in the Constitutional Convention or 
in state ratifying conventions conceded that a tax on real estate 
would be a direct tax. The Justices in Hylton certainly thought 
that to be the case. 137 Congress could impose a wealth tax, but to 
do so, it would have to apportion the tax. 
Professor Johnson tries to have it both ways with Hylton. 
He cites the case as the incontrovertibly correct product of "gi-
ants" when it stands for a position he likes (that apportionment 
should be required only when it makes no difference). He ig-
nores the same "giants" when they say something he dislikes 
(that an unapportioned tax on wealth is a direct tax). Moreover, 
in the cases between Hylton and Pollock, which Professor John-
son characterizes as correctly holding that the Direct-Tax 
135. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 1728-29. Professor Ackerman also concludes that 
an unapportioned tax on real estate would be permissible, but not because of original 
understanding or any attempt to divine the meaning of "taxes on incomes." Instead, 
[s]ince the epic struggle between Franklin Roosevelt and the Old Court, the ju-
diciary has consistently upheld democratic efforts to take control of the econ-
omy in pursuit of social justice. Under the constitutional regime inaugurated by 
the New Deal, there are no significant limits on the national government's tax-
mg, spendmg, and regulatory power where the economy is concerned-other 
than the requirement that government compensate owners if their property is 
taken for public purposes. 
Ackerman, supra note 3, at 3. I'll let others assault the proposition that "constitutional 
moments" amend the Constitution. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY 
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONA~ 
FOUNDATIONS 109-16 (2002). 
I 36. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 1728-29. 
I 37. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
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Clauses didn't limit the taxes at issue, the Supreme Court as-
sumed that a real-estate tax was a direct tax. 138 
There's no reason to look for a more general intent in inter-
preting a provision when we have absolute proof that the foun-
ders thought that a tax on real-estate was direct. Even if you 
think it's intellectually anomalous to constrain taxes on real es-
tate, that's not a justification for ignoring provisions intended to 
do just that. I reject treating Hylton as a definitive interpretation 
of the Direct-Tax Clauses, but the alignment between Hylton 
and evidence from other sources should leave no doubt about 
the characterization of a tax on real estate. 
Further evidence that the founding giants considered a real-
estate tax to be direct can be found in legislation. In 1798, Con-
gress passed the first of several national taxes on real estate, and 
Congress apportioned the tax, using a complex mechanism to 
satisfy the apportionment rule. 139 If the behavior of early Con-
gresses reflects the original understanding, as is often argued, 
then clearly a real-estate tax is direct. 
My use of congressional behavior is not inconsistent with 
my criticism of the 1797 taxing statute. There's a difference be-
tween relying on an early determination that Congress was 
bound by constitutional limitations, as I'm doing here, and using 
a congressional enactment like the 1797 Act to "prove" that con-
stitutional limitations don't apply. We can trust legislative bodies 
when they see limitations on their power (particularly when 
they're acting in a way consistent with other evidence of original 
understanding) much more readily than we can trust legislative 
bodies that purport to see no limitations. 
A skeptic might respond that Congress wasn't necessarily 
indicating any particular understanding of constitutional re-
quirements with the 1798 real-estate tax; maybe it was just acting 
cautiously by providing for apportionment. Congress doesn't 
have to exercise its full taxing power, of course, so what a cau-
tious Congress does isn't controlling and may not even be help-
ful in determining the boundaries of congressional power. 
That can't be what was going on in 1798, however. With the 
way the apportionment and uniformity rules are set up, there 
was no "cautious" position for Congress to take. The two rules 
are mutually exclusive: one rule or the other must apply to any 
138. See supra note 21. 
139. See Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, (1 Stat.) 597. 
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particular tax, and a tax can't satisfy both rules simultaneously 
(except in the unlikely event that the tax base is distributed pro-
portionately to state populations). To do its constitutionally 
mandated job, Congress must determine whether a tax is direct 
because it must decide whether the tax must be apportioned or 
whether it must be uniform. Congress in 1798 had to determine 
whether a tax on real-estate was direct, and it made that deter-
mination consistent with the pervasive understanding of the 
time. 
* * * * * 
Not all of the founders were power-grabbers, of course, and 
not all of the actions of early governmental bodies were constitu-
tionally suspect. In this discussion of Hylton and the 1797 Act, 
my point is only that there's no reason to think that founders-in-
power were right in constitutional interpretation merely because 
they were "giants." In trying to discern the original understand-
ing of the Direct Tax Clauses, we need to look at original 
sources more broadly-including the language of the Constitu-
tion itself-and to look for a meaning that gives the Clauses ef-
fect. Professor Johnson hasn't done that; I think I have. An in-
terpretation that treats direct taxes as levies without indirect 
taxes' built-in protections against governmental abuse gives sub-
stance to the Clauses within the constitutional structure. 
IV. THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT 
To this point, I've been defending the significance of the Di-
rect-Tax Clauses. If those Clauses have no effect, then we have 
no need to parse the language of the Sixteenth Amendment. An 
exemption from the direct-tax apportionment rule is irrelevant if 
the apportionment rule is meaningless today. 
For the remainder of this article, I'll assume that my argu-
ment has been right so far and that the Direct-Tax Clauses were 
intended to be significant limitations on the taxing power, far 
more significant than the Hylton Court suggested. I'll also as-
sume that Pollock was rightly decided. There's a lot in the Pol-
lock opinions that is embarrassing, but the result was right. The 
1894 income tax wasn't an indirect tax-it wasn't shiftable and 
therefore avoidable-and, without the characteristics of indirect 
taxes, an income tax was potentially dangerous. Notwithstanding 
Hylton's dicta, the income tax should therefore have been sub-
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ject to the apportionment rule. 140 In fact, if one of the reasons for 
the rule was to discourage sectionally directed taxes, the income 
tax in 1894 was Exhibit A: given the concentration of wealth in 
the industrialized Northeast, the 1894 tax was clearly directed at 
one section of the country. Indeed, Populists reveled in the sec-
tional effects of the income tax. 141 
A. INTERPRETING "TAXES ON INCOMES" 
With those assumptions, the interpretive question for the 
Sixteenth Amendment should be straightforward: What sorts of 
taxes did the Amendment remove from the otherwise applicable 
rule requiring apportionment of direct taxes? 
For Professors Johnson and Ackerman, however, that ques-
tion doesn't matter. In their view, the Amendment wasn't neces-
sary from a technical standpoint. Pollock was so clearly wrong 
that Congress should have been able to enact another unaRpor-
tioned income tax without tinkering with the Constitution. 4 At 
the turn of the twentieth century, a number of congressmen 
thought that as well. They argued in favor of enacting a new in-
come tax, expecting that the Supreme Court would reverse di-
rection in the inevitable challenge and overturn Pollock. 143 
It nevertheless eventually became clear to income-tax sup-
porters that there could be no unapportioned income tax with-
out a constitutional amendment. For congressmen who thought 
Pollock was defensible-and their numbers were almost cer-
tainly larger than Professors Johnson and Ackerman think-
there was no alternative to amending the Constitution. But even 
congressmen who thought an amendment unnecessary were 
nervous about offending the Supreme Court by enacting a new 
tax without constitutional protection.144 (Besides, there was no 
140. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; Jensen, Apportionment, supra 
note 16, at 1077-79. 
141. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 16, at 1095-107. 
142. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 1731-33; Ackerman, supra note 3, at 31. 
143. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1109-14. 
144. See 44 CONG. REC. 3936 (1909) (statement of Cal. Sen. Frank P. Flint reporting 
on the decision of the Senate Finance Committee to recommend a constitutional 
amendment: "We felt that, in view of the decision ... in the Pollock case, it would be in-
delicate, at least, for the Congress of the United States to pass another measure and ask 
the Supreme Court to pass upon it, when they had already passed upon the proposi-
tion .... "). There's also evidence that some who "supported" a constitutional amend-
ment, rather than a new statute, thought an amendment wouldn't be ratified. They hoped 
to destroy the idea of an income tax while apparently endorsing it. See Jensen, Taxing 
Power, supra note 16, at 1112-14. 
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guarantee that the Court would overrule Pollock. 145) As Profes-
sors Johnson and Ackerman see things, Pollock-skeptics out-
numbered those who thought the case was rightly decided, and 
the Amendment merely made it politically possible to enact a 
new income tax. 
Professors Johnson and Ackerman go even further. They 
argue that the Amendment was drafted to show congressional 
disdain for the Supreme Court's determination in Pollock and to 
return the constitutional understanding to the pre-Pollock era, 
when at most capitation and real-estate taxes were governed by 
apportionment. They stress that Congress, in assembling the 
resolution that became the Sixteenth Amendment, carefully 
chose language to show that it didn't accept Pollock and that an 
expansive conception of "direct taxes" was wrong. 
That's an interesting idea, but it isn't necessarily relevant to 
constitutional analysis-why should we care what Congress in 
1909 thought about the constitutional merits of Pollock? 146 It 
also bears no apparent relationship to reality. There's no evi-
dence whatsoever that the language of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment was crafted to repudiate Pollock except in the most obvi-
ous way, by making it possible to have a tax on incomes without 
apportionment. 147 
It's always a good idea to start the interpretive process with 
constitutional language. Nothing in the text of the Sixteenth 
Amendment suggests the far-reaching consequences that Profes-
sors Johnson and Ackerman see. Pollock had invalidated an in-
come tax because it hadn't been apportioned, and the Amend-
ment on its face makes it possible to have a "tax on incomes" 
without apportionment. As Professor Fiss has noted, the 
Amendment "simply removed what appeared to be a technical 
objection or impediment that Pollock had posed to the income 
tax." 148 It exempted one category of taxes from apportionment, 
nothing more. 
145. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1109-14. 
146. We're as well-equipped to evaluate the merits as a bunch of congressmen were. 
Besides, the congressmen who thought Pollock was wrong (and there were many, I con· 
cede) weren't going back to first principles. They were restating what had tecome con· 
ventional wisdom before Pollock, a?d, not coincidentally, arguing that congressional 
power should be unconstramed. "We can do what we want" is a position you'd expect 
most congressmen to take on almost any issue. 
147. See generally Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1091-129. 
148. FISS, supra note 44, at 100. 
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And that was quite enough. It's not as though dealing with 
Pollock in this technical way was trivial. In fact, the practical 
consequences of the Sixteenth Amendment were so far-
reaching- the personal income tax is an incredible revenue-
raiser-that it's hard to see why anyone would feel the need to 
look for still broader effects. Think of the politics of the early 
twentieth century: If you wanted to make an unapportioned in-
come tax possible (and a majority of congressmen wanted to do 
just that), and if you thought that a constitutional amendment 
was going to be politically necessary to get that result, what 
would you try to do? Draft an amendment as broadly as possible 
so as to increase the likelihood of resistance? Or draft a narrow 
amendment that unquestionably made an unapportioned income 
tax possible? The answer should be obvious. 
Professors Johnson and Ackerman also can't identify any 
legislative history to support their counterintuitive interpreta-
tion. The final language of the Amendment wasn't hammered 
out on the floors of the Houses of Congress, with recorded de-
bates to guide us as to what was happening. The language was 
drafted in closed sessions of the Senate Finance Committee, a 
committee controlled by Pollock-friendly Republicans and 
chaired by Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, no fan of 
the income tax. 149 We don't know exactly what happened, but it's 
incredible to think that these folks were trying to devise lan-
guage to undercut Pollock's broad rationale. 
Both Professors Johnson and Ackerman attach great sig-
nificance to the fact that the Finance Committee removed a ref-
erence to "direct taxes" from a draft resolution. There's no evi-
dence, however, that the deletion was intended to signal a 
repudiation of Pollock. If anything, the change points in the op-
posite direction. 
Senator Norris Brown's original language for what became 
the Sixteenth Amendment provided that "Congress shall have 
power to lay and collect direct taxes on incomes" without appor-
tionment among the several States according to population.150 
As the resolution came out of the Finance Committee, the 
Amendment made no specific reference to direct taxation: "The 
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, 
149. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1119. Aldrich was one of those 
nominal "supporters" of a constitutional amendment who probably hoped to use the 
process to kill the income tax. See supra note 144. 
150. S.J. Res. 25, 61st Cong., 44 CONG. REC. 1568 (1909). 
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from whatever source derived, without apportionment among 
the several States and without regard to any census or enumera-
tion."151 According to Professor Johnson, "[t]he change, reject-
ing Brown's language, is relevant evidence that Congress, in 
proposing the amendment, did not mean to treat the income tax 
as direct, and did not mean to make taxes that fell just outside 
the definition of income, as taxes that failed for want of appor-
tionment."152 
Professor Ackerman extends the argument, accusing Sena-
tor Brown of a "clever verbalism." Brown, he says, aimed "to 
transform this tactical retreat [having to amend the Constitution 
to make an income tax possible] into a long-run conservative vic-
tory" by conceding the direct character of income taxes, thereby 
"explicitly endorsing the Pollock majority's vast expansion of the 
concept" of direct taxes. 153 When new language emerged from 
the Finance Committee, it was 
a major retreat from Brown's conservative ambitions. Gone 
was [Brown's] express vindication of Pollock's decision to ex-
pand the category of "direct" taxation; in its place we find an 
explicit repudiation of Pollock's effort to expand the category 
by insisting that an income tax, from whatever source derived, 
should be immune from the rule of apportionment. 154 
The Committee drafters, Professor Ackerman says, "took spe-
cial efforts to avoid freezing Pollock's doctrine concerning the 
scope of the 'direct tax' clauses." 155 The language "had been re-
vised to eliminate all explicit endorsement of Pollock's reason-
ing. ,Is6 
I have no idea where any of that comes from. There are no 
historical documents that support any of these suppositions, 
nothing to show "explicit repudiations" and "special efforts" in 
committee. If anything, the change in the language of the Brown 
resolution points in the opposite direction. The resolution hinted 
that there might be some income taxes that aren't direct (there 
are "direct taxes on incomes" but also therefore indirect taxes on 
incomes). If a congressman wanted to make it clear that Pollock 
was rightly decided, that an income tax is ipso facto a direct tax, 
151. S.J. Res. 40, 61st Cong., 44 CONG. REC. 3900 (1909). 
152. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1733. 
153. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 37. 
154. !d. at 38. 
155. !d. at 51 (emphasis deleted). 
156. !d. at 38. 
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he would have wanted to change Brown's language. In short, it's 
far more plausible to read the Amendment as a vindication 
rather than a repudiation of Pollock. 157 
In any event, the term used in the Amendment proper is 
"taxes on incomes," which doesn't come close to supporting the 
idea that the pre-Pollock understanding was to be resuscitated 
or, more broadly, that all direct taxes (except maybe capitation 
taxes) were to be exempted from apportionment. In fact, the 
Senate explicitly considered and rejected proposals to do just 
that. Before the Brown resolution had been sent to committee, 
Senator Anselm McLaurin of Mississippi argued that because 
the impediment Congress faced was the Direct-Tax Clauses, 
Congress should strike out the references to direct taxes and 
leave apportionment to apply only to capitation taxes. Doing so 
would "accomplish all that (Brown's] amendment proposes to 
accomplish and not make a constitutional amendment for the 
enacting of a single act of legislation" [the income tax]. 158 Sena-
tor Brown refused the apparently friendly amendment, however: 
"That may be true, Mr. President; but my purpose is to confine it 
to income taxes alone, and to forever settle the dispute by refer-
ring the subject to the several States. "159 
After the resolution had been reported by the Finance 
Committee, with much of the language changed but with the ref-
erence to "taxes on incomes" intact, Senator McLaurin again 
suggested it would be better to amend the Constitution to delete 
references to "direct taxes. "160 McLaurin said that his proposal 
would "eliminate from the Constitution every cause of conten-
tion over the question of the authority of Congress to levy an in-
come tax, except as to the power of Congress to grade an income 
tax." 161 And he was worried that by passing a resolution applica-
ble only to income taxes, Congress misht be seen as "recog-
niz[ing] the income tax as a direct tax." 1 Once again, however, 
McLaurin's proposal went nowhere. The Amendment was lim-
ited in its language, and it was intended to be that way. 
With the language of the Amendment as ratified, and with 
no evidence that the Amendment was intended to eliminate the 
157. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1120. 
158. 44 CONG. REC. 3377 (1909). 
159. /d. (emphasis added); see Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1120-21 (dis-
cussing why Brown might have wanted to limit the scope of the Amendment). 
160. See 44 CONG. REC. 4067 (1909); 44 CONG. REC. 4109 (1909). 
161. 44 CONG. REC. 4109 (1909). 
162. /d. 
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apportionment rule for anything except "taxes on incomes," we 
have to interpret that term as given. We can't duck the responsi-
bility of determining whether a tax is direct to begin with and, if 
so, whether it's an income tax. Within the universe of "direct 
taxes," only "taxes on incomes" are exempt from apportion-
ment. 
I can't promise a precise definition of "taxes on incomes," 
but I can suggest a couple of categories that don't qualify-
direct-consumption taxes and wealth taxes. I've argued else-
where that the determination of what constitutes a "tax on in-
comes" should be informed by the debates that led to the adop-
tion of the 1894 income tax, and, after the Supreme Court struck 
down that tax as unconstitutional, by the process that culminated 
in the Sixteenth Amendment. Those debates make it clear that 
the proponents of an income tax and the proponents of the 
Amendment saw income taxes and consumption taxes as funda-
mentally different levies. 163 
Before the modern income tax, the national government re-
lied almost entirely for revenue on indirect consumption taxes 
(tariffs and excises), which had increasingly come to be seen as 
unfair. The point of the push for income taxation was to rechan-
nel the national government's historical reliance on consumption 
taxes, not to validate new, direct forms of consumption taxes. If 
an unapportioned consumption tax is direct- and some modern 
proposals for direct-consumption taxes would be "direct" for 
constitutional purposes-it would have to be a "tax on incomes" 
to be constitutional. Given the history of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment, I'm skeptical that a consumption tax would qualify. 
Nor does the history of the Amendment support the propo-
sition that a wealth tax ought to be characterized as a "tax on in-
comes." (There's no doubt that a tax on wealth was originally 
understood to be a direct tax. 164 If an unapportioned tax on 
wealth would be constitutional today, it has to be because of the 
Sixteenth Amendment.165) There were certainly congressmen at 
the time who characterized the income tax as an attack on con-
centrations of wealth. But the congressmen were talking about 
163. See generally Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1100-02 & 1124-26. 
164. See supra Part III.D.3. 
165. As an alternative to his primary argument that a wealth tax isn't direct, Profes-
sor Johnson also argues that a wealth tax ought to be characterized as a "tax on income." 
See Johnson, supra note 30, at 1733. 
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imposing taxes on the wealthy through an income tax, not about 
levying taxes measured by the value of the wealth itself. 166 
It would have made no sense for income-tax proponents to 
draft the Amendment in a broader way than necessary. If a 
property tax might have been understood to be a "tax on in-
comes," that could only have complicated prospects of ratifica-
tion. Getting authority for an unapportioned income tax was an 
extraordinary expansion of the national revenue power as it was. 
The need for still other forms of taxation wasn't apparent then, 
and it's not apparent now. 
* * * * * 
Not every direct tax is a "tax on incomes" automatically ex-
empt from apportionment because of the Sixteenth Amendment. 
A conscious decision was made to limit the Sixteenth Amend-
ment's scope to "taxes on incomes." All that the Amendment 
did-all that it was intended to do-was to enable an unappor-
tioned income tax. 
B. THE CONTEMPORANEOUS UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE AMENDMENT 
The understanding that the Sixteenth Amendment exempts 
only a discrete category of taxes- "taxes on incomes"- from 
apportionment isn't something I'm making up. It reflects the 
language and history of the Amendment, and it was also the un-
derstanding of courts and Congress after ratification. 
1. The Courts 
For the first two decades after ratification, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the Sixteenth Amendment as requiring careful 
consideration of whether a tax that would otherwise be subject 
to apportionment might be a "tax on incomes." 
When the original understanding of the Direct-Tax Clauses 
is at issue, Professor Johnson and other proponents of a nearly 
unlimited taxing power tell us that what the Supreme Court said 
in Hylton, decided seven years after the ratification of the Con-
stitution, was definitive. The Federalist Justices said almost ex-
actly what Professor Johnson wants to hear, and we're therefore 
told that the Court understood the recently drafted constitu-
tional language better than we can. 
166. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1128-29. 
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In contrast, no one seems to care about what the Supreme 
Court said in interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment. There 
were Court decisions interpreting the Amendment within seven 
years of ratification, but Professor Johnson and friends don't 
think we should pay attention to those cases. Why don't we treat 
those Justices as among the "giants" of the Amendment? 
I guess we don't do that because those old decisions as-
sumed that the term "taxes on incomes" had content, that the 
Amendment wasn't a complete repudiation of the Direct-Tax 
Clauses, and that not every unapportioned tax that Congress 
might have characterized as a tax on incomes was automatically 
valid. The Court viewed the Amendment quite differently from 
Professor Johnson, who argues that "'income' ... is a malleable 
concept" that can mean what Congress and the courts want it to 
mean.'~ 67 
The big case is Eisner v. Macomber, 168 in which the Court in 
1920 considered whether Congress's inclusion of totally propor-
tionate stock dividends within the base of an unapportioned in-
come tax was constitutional. Macomber, who had received a 
stock dividend that didn't change her interest in the distributing 
corporation, argued that the dividend wasn't "income" and 
therefore wasn't exempted from apportionment by the Sixteenth 
Amendment. With Pollock still on the books, the tax on the 
dividend was direct. If the tax wasn't on "incomes," it had to be 
apportioned. 
Of the nine Justices sitting in Macomber, seven took Mrs. 
Macomber's argument seriously. The five-man majority, in an 
opinion by Justice Pitney, concluded that a totally proportionate 
stock dividend wasn't "income": it did nothing more than cut up 
the already existing corporate pie into more pieces, keeping 
every shareholder's fraction unchanged. 169 The Court and 
Macomber understood, as Yogi Berra didn't, that it makes no 
difference whether you cut your pizza into four or eight slices if 
you consume the whole thing yourself. 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Brandeis Uoined by Justice 
Clarke) offered reasons why stock dividends could be treated as 
income and could therefore properly be included in an income-
tax base. Like the majority, however, Justice Brandeis accepted 
the proposition that the term "incomes" had content. Although 
167. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1733. 
168. 252 u.s. 189 (1920). 
169. /d. at 210-11. 
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congressional power was to be "liberally construed," 170 the 
Amendment wasn't intended to permit Congress to avoid appor-
tionment simply by characterizing an item as income. Indeed, 
Justice Brandeis noted in a later case that "Congress cannot 
make a thing income which is not so in fact." 171 
Macomber wasn't aberrational. In two other cases decided 
during the 1920s, Weiss v. Stearn 172 and Edwards v. Cuba Rail-
road Co., 173 the Court rejected taxes on the ground that the taxes 
were direct and didn't fit the Amendment's definition of "taxes 
on income."174 Many other cases took it for granted that the term 
"taxes on incomes" had enforceable content. 175 
For many modern commentators, however, only one opin-
ion in Macomber really matters, that of Justice Holmes Uoined 
by Justice Day), who thought the whole issue was silly. In a line 
quoted by both Professors Johnson and Ackerman, Holmes 
wrote that "[t]he known purpose of the Amendment was to get 
rid of nice questions as to what might be direct taxes." 176 Ac-
cording to Professor Johnson, Justice Holmes "showed his wis-
dom" by that comment. 177 
Justice Holmes didn't explicitly say that the Direct-Tax 
Clauses were no longer relevant. His opinion is cursory-
"giants" don't have to explain-but it's conceivable that he 
meant only that the Clauses should return to their meaning be-
fore Pollock, with the relatively easily identified categories of 
capitation and real-estate taxes still subject to apportionment. 178 
170. /d. at 226 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
171. Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 114 (1925) (Brandeis, J.). 
172. 265 U.S. 242 (1924). 
173. 268 U.S. 628 (1925). 
174. See generally Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1138-40. 
175. See, e.g., Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921) 
("[T]his Court has ... approved ... what it believed to be the commonly understood 
meaning of the term ['income'] which must have been in the minds of people when they 
adopted the Sixteenth Amendment .... "); Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 
170, 174 (1926) ("It was not the purpose or effect of that amendment to bring any new 
subject within the taxing power"); Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 481 (1929) ("[T]he set-
tled doctrine is that the Sixteenth Amendment confers no power upon Congress to de-
fine and tax as income without apportionment something which theretofore could not 
have been properly regarded as income"); Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 
379 (1934) ("The rental value of the building used by the owner docs not constitute in-
come within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment"). 
176. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 219-20. 
177. Johnson, supra note 30, at1734. 
178. Even then categorization won't be automatic: there may be "nice questions" as 
to whether a tax is on real estate or not. For example, in Helvering v. Independent Life 
Insurance Co., 292 U.S. at 378, the Court, in dictum, suggested that a tax on what might 
be characterized as imputed income associated with real estate would be subject to ap-
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That interpretation would have been questionable enough, 
but let's suppose Justice Holmes meant, as many commentators 
assume, that the Sixteenth Amendment rendered the Direct-Tax 
Clauses dead letters. If that was his point, where in the world did 
it come from? Seven other Justices said nothing of the sort. Even 
two of the dissenters (Justices Brandeis and Clarke) assumed 
that the term "incomes" meant something. Indeed, Justice 
Holmes felt constrained, albeit minimally, by the language of the 
Amendment. He purported to be interpreting the word "in-
comes" and to be looking for "a sense most obvious to the com-
mon understanding at the time of [the Amendment's] adop-
tion."179 If Holmes was wrong about what people were thinking 
during ratification, however, his conclusion was wrong. The lan-
guage of the Amendment doesn't suggest anything like Holmes's 
interpretation, and, probably most telling, Holmes cited noth-
ing-no evidence, no authority-to support his contention. 
Justice Holmes provided no evidence or authority because 
there was none. In fact, as I've noted, the Senate had explicitly 
considered, and rejected, proposals to delete the references to 
"direct taxes." 180 Such a step would really have eliminated "nice 
questions" about meaning, but that didn't happen. And I can't 
imagine the ratifiers of the Sixteenth Amendment thought that 
Congress can define anything as income. If there had been any 
hint that the Amendment would permit an unapportioned tax on 
all forms of unrealized appreciation, say-a tax on property-
the ratification of the Amendment would have been much more 
difficult, and maybe impossible. 
Ultimately we're supposed to pay attention to Justice 
Holmes, I guess, because he was Holmes, a "giant," and that's 
pretty much what Professor Ackerman says. He notes that "we 
can never recapture the directness of [Holmes's] lived experi-
ence of the [Amendment's] ratification campaign." 181 As a re-
sult, "we are left with Holmes's ipse dixits concerning original 
understanding-certainly an important resource, but one that 
may be too easily dismissed by readers who have not themselves 
lived through the process of amendment ratification. " 182 
portionmcnt. 
179. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 220 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (quoting Bishop v. State, 
149 Ind. 223, 230 (1898)). 
180. See supra notes 152-156 and accompanying text; Jensen, Taxing Power, supra 
note 16, at 1120-21. 
181. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 45. 
182. !d. at 45-46. Since ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment took over 
two hundred years, from 1789 until 1992, the universe of people "who have not ... lived 
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When the language of the Amendment doesn't support your 
position, and you can't find any other favorable evidence, posit 
"wisdom" and "lived experience"! I'm sorry, but I find it impos-
sible to take these positions seriously. 
After all, the other members of the Macomber Court lived 
through precisely the same ratification process-which ended 
only seven years before the case was decided-yet all but Justice 
Day, who joined in Justice Holmes's opinion, saw things in a 
very different way. What's the reason for thinking that Holmes's 
experience for these purposes was more worthy of note than the 
experiences of the other Justices? 
Professor Ackerman likes the Holmesian view because he 
sees the Amendment as part of an uprising to repudiate Pollock 
and reestablish plenary taxing power: "When the People [sic] 
mobilize to overrule the Court, it seems particularly inappropri-
ate for the Justices to respond in a niggling fashion." 183 But view-
ing the Amendment as part of a move to validate an unlimited 
national taxing power is silly. The Amendment was intended to 
make possible a tax that, at the time, reached a trivial fraction of 
the population. If the "People" were mobilizing, it was to enable 
a tax that would hit someone else. 184 
Notwithstanding Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court 
thought the language of the Sixteenth Amendment was worthy 
of being interpreted, a result that shouldn't be surprising. (Some 
might even find this result reassuring: language matters!) Not 
every tax (or part of a tax) is automatically a "tax on incomes." 
To determine whether a direct tax is exempt from apportion-
ment, we need to determine whether it's a "tax on incomes." 
2. Congress 
Modern proponents of a nearly unlimited taxing power also 
ignore the actions of Congress immediately after ratification of 
the Sixteenth Amendment. Congress initially interpreted its ex-
panded power to enact an unapportioned tax on incomes in a 
conservative way. Congress's conduct didn't necessarily reflect 
the outer boundaries of its power, of course, but we can say this 
through the process of amendment ratification" is pretty small. (I'm still tingling from the 
experience.) 
183. /d. at 55. 
184. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 16, at 2343 n.41 (noting that 1894 in-
come tax directly affected only about one percent of the population). 
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much for sure: after ratification, Congress didn't think that it had 
unconstrained power to define something as "income." 
For example, Congress didn't-and, for that matter, still 
doesn't-define a corporate dividend paid out of pre-1913 earn-
ings as being taxable, even though the Supreme Court has sug-
gested there would be no constitutional problem as long as the 
dividend is distributed after the Amendment became effective. 185 
Nor did Congress ever try to tax pre-1913 appreciation in the 
value of property, even if the appreciation is realized after 
1913.186 
Congress acted conservatively because the term "taxes on 
incomes"-which came out of Congress, after all-wasn't under-
stood to be all-encompassing. With the Supreme Court looking 
over its shoulder, Congress was being extra careful not to exceed 
its constitutional powers. We can argue about what the bounda-
ries of congressional taxing power are, but Congress recognized 
that the Sixteenth Amendment hadn't eliminated boundaries al-
together. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article was intended as an exercise in taking constitu-
tional provisions seriously, something all readers of Constitu-
tional Commentary should see as a worthwhile goal. The Direct-
Tax Clauses haven't been hot topics of constitutional discussion 
for nearly a century, but they were intended to be important. 
And they could still have effect today if the concept of "direct 
taxes" retains significance and the term "taxes on incomes" is 
limited in its effects. Although the Sixteenth Amendment dimin-
ished the importance of the Clauses by making it possible to 
have a "tax on incomes" without apportionment, the Amend-
ment didn't repeal the Clauses. 
185. For 1913, the tax applied only to "net income accruing from March first to De-
cember thirty-first." Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, § II.D (38 Stat. 166) 168. Congress 
didn't try to tax distributions from pre-1913 earnings. See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 
2(a) (39 Stat. 756) 757 (defining "dividends" as distributions "out of earnings or profits 
accrued since March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen"); I.R.C. § 316(a)(1) (1994) 
(defining "dividends" as distributions out of "earnings and profits accumulated after 
February 28, 1913"). 
186. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(a)(1) (40 Stat. 1057) 1060 (providing that 
for "property acquired before March 1, 1913, the fair market value of such property as of 
that date" would be its basis); see also I.R.C. § 301(c)(3)(B) (1994) (exempting non-
dividend distributions exceeding basis to the extent the distribution is "out of increase in 
value accrued before March 1, 1913"); I.R.C. § 1015(c) (1994) (treating as the basis of 
property acquired by gift before 1921 the value at the time of acquisition). 
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Not all taxes are automatically constitutional. Words mat-
ter, and we shouldn't assume that terms like "direct taxes" and 
"taxes on incomes" are infinitely malleable. No tax since 1861 
has been apportioned, and I assume Congress isn't likely to con-
sider enacting an apportioned tax ever again. But if a proposed 
tax is going to avoid the apportionment requirement, it's essen-
tial that the tax either be indirect or be a "tax on incomes." 
